feat(cli): v3.2 multi-hop — per-hop cert, cell padding, 3-hop, CIDR whitelist

Closes the v3.1 unlinkability gap and resists volume/timing correlation:

1) Per-hop client cert (identity-unlinkable hops). [[client.circuit.hops]]
   now accepts {addr, cert_path, key_path, [server_name]} per hop — each
   hop sees a different CN, so a relay and an exit cannot correlate the
   same client by certificate. Old flat `hops = ["ip:port"]` form still
   parses (serde untagged enum) and falls back to [pki] cert/key.
   `aura provision-client --circuit-hops N` mints N fresh UUIDv4 certs.

2) Cell padding. CellPaddingConn wrapper pads every outgoing packet to a
   fixed size (default 1280 bytes; `cell_size = N` configurable) before
   it hits the inner AEAD. Format: u16_be(real_len) || pkt || zero_pad.
   On-wire sizes become constant -> defeats volume/timing fingerprints.
   Opt-in via [client.circuit] cell_padding = true and the mirror
   [server] cell_padding_for_circuit_clients = true.

3) 3-hop support. dial_circuit now accepts N >= 2 hops; iterative
   ExtendBridge nests N-1 forwarders and N handshakes. Client owns the
   full chain via CircuitConnection (forwarders abort on drop).
   New integration test multihop_v3_2_three_hops_end_to_end runs three
   in-process actors (A relay -> B relay -> C exit) on loopback and
   verifies peer_id == C's CN.

4) CIDR whitelist. [server.relay] allow_extend_to entries accept
   "10.0.0.0/24" (subnet, any port), "10.0.0.0/24:443" (subnet + port),
   "[2001:db8::/32]:443" (IPv6 with port), as well as exact IP:port.
   Empty list keeps the v3.1 open-relay (warn).

19 new tests; workspace 276 passed (+19), clippy -D warnings clean, fmt clean.
257 baseline tests untouched; all v2 / v3.1 / LE configs work as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

crates/aura-cli/src/cells.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+//! v3.2: **cell padding** — a constant-size frame wrapper around any [`PacketConnection`].
+//!
+//! ## Why
+//!
+//! In v3.1 a packet's on-wire size leaks the *type* of payload (a TCP ack vs an HTTP response vs a
+//! video chunk). Even with AEAD encryption a traffic analyst can correlate sizes with applications.
+//! v3.2 closes that side-channel by **padding every packet to a fixed cell size** before it is
+//! handed to the underlying connection: the analyst sees a uniform stream of equal-size cells with
+//! no length information leaking out.
+//!
+//! ## Wire format
+//!
+//! Each cell is a `cell_size`-byte buffer:
+//!
+//! ```text
+//!   ┌─────────┬──────────────────────┬────────────────────────┐
+//!   │ len: u16│   payload (len bytes)│   padding (zero bytes) │
+//!   │ big-end │                      │  (or random; AEAD hides)│
+//!   └─────────┴──────────────────────┴────────────────────────┘
+//!   0         2                    2 + len               cell_size
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Bytes `0..2` are the big-endian payload length. Bytes `2..2+len` hold the real payload (an inner
+//! IP packet). The remainder `2+len..cell_size` is zero-filled padding — the underlying AEAD layer
+//! (inside the Aura transport) re-encrypts the entire cell so the zeros are indistinguishable from
+//! random bytes on the wire.
+//!
+//! ## Symmetric requirement
+//!
+//! Both peers MUST agree on `cell_size`. If the sender pads to 1280 but the receiver tries to parse
+//! the bytes as a raw packet, parsing will fail (or, worse, succeed silently with garbage). The CLI
+//! exposes the `[client.circuit] cell_padding` and `[server] cell_padding_for_circuit_clients`
+//! knobs; **enable them together on every hop** in a circuit (entry-relay + exit, or entry +
+//! middle + exit).
+//!
+//! ## Capacity
+//!
+//! A cell of `cell_size` bytes carries at most `cell_size - 2` bytes of payload (the 2-byte length
+//! prefix). Sending a packet larger than that is a hard error — the caller must fragment upstream.
+//! With the default `cell_size = 1280`, capacity is 1278 bytes which comfortably fits an IPv4 MTU
+//! of 1280 (the Aura TUN default is 1420; operators using cell padding should lower it accordingly).
+
+use std::sync::Arc;
+
+use anyhow::bail;
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use aura_proto::PacketConnection;
+
+/// A [`PacketConnection`] wrapper that pads every outgoing packet to a constant `cell_size` and
+/// strips the padding on the receive side. Both peers MUST use the same `cell_size` (see the module
+/// docs).
+pub struct CellPaddingConn {
+    inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
+    cell_size: usize,
+}
+
+impl CellPaddingConn {
+    /// Default cell size: 1280 bytes (the IPv6 minimum MTU). Comfortably fits the common IPv4 MTU
+    /// and matches a value an HTTPS observer would not find suspicious.
+    pub const DEFAULT_CELL_SIZE: usize = 1280;
+
+    /// Maximum payload bytes carried by a default-sized cell (1280 - 2 = 1278).
+    pub const MAX_PAYLOAD: usize = Self::DEFAULT_CELL_SIZE - 2;
+
+    /// Wrap `inner` with constant-size cell padding at `cell_size` bytes.
+    ///
+    /// `cell_size` MUST be at least 3 (length prefix + 1 payload byte). The constructor does not
+    /// validate this; callers should use [`CellPaddingConn::DEFAULT_CELL_SIZE`] unless they have a
+    /// reason to override it (the runtime check inside [`PacketConnection::send_packet`] would
+    /// reject the resulting connection for any non-empty packet anyway).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn new(inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, cell_size: usize) -> Self {
+        Self { inner, cell_size }
+    }
+
+    /// The cell size this wrapper is using (informational; for tests / logs).
+    #[must_use]
+    pub fn cell_size(&self) -> usize {
+        self.cell_size
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl PacketConnection for CellPaddingConn {
+    async fn send_packet(&self, pkt: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+        let cap = self.cell_size.saturating_sub(2);
+        if pkt.len() > cap {
+            bail!(
+                "packet {} bytes exceeds cell payload capacity {} (cell_size = {})",
+                pkt.len(),
+                cap,
+                self.cell_size
+            );
+        }
+        // Allocate the constant-size cell, write the 2-byte big-endian length, copy the payload,
+        // leave the rest as zeros. The encryption layer (Aura transport AEAD, wrapped around this
+        // by every hop) will turn the zero-tail into ciphertext indistinguishable from random.
+        let mut cell = vec![0u8; self.cell_size];
+        let len_bytes = (pkt.len() as u16).to_be_bytes();
+        cell[0] = len_bytes[0];
+        cell[1] = len_bytes[1];
+        cell[2..2 + pkt.len()].copy_from_slice(pkt);
+        self.inner.send_packet(&cell).await
+    }
+
+    async fn recv_packet(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+        let cell = self.inner.recv_packet().await?;
+        if cell.len() < 2 {
+            bail!(
+                "cell shorter than the 2-byte length prefix ({} bytes received)",
+                cell.len()
+            );
+        }
+        let real_len = u16::from_be_bytes([cell[0], cell[1]]) as usize;
+        if real_len > cell.len().saturating_sub(2) {
+            bail!(
+                "cell length prefix {} exceeds available cell payload ({})",
+                real_len,
+                cell.len().saturating_sub(2)
+            );
+        }
+        Ok(cell[2..2 + real_len].to_vec())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::collections::VecDeque;
+    use tokio::sync::Mutex as TokioMutex;
+
+    /// In-memory bidirectional pipe: each call to `send_packet` pushes the bytes onto a queue;
+    /// `recv_packet` pops from a (separately-loaded) queue. This lets us drive both sides of a
+    /// padded conversation without bringing in a real Aura transport.
+    struct MockConn {
+        send_log: TokioMutex<Vec<Vec<u8>>>,
+        recv_queue: TokioMutex<VecDeque<Vec<u8>>>,
+    }
+    impl MockConn {
+        fn new(recv: impl IntoIterator<Item = Vec<u8>>) -> Arc<Self> {
+            Arc::new(Self {
+                send_log: TokioMutex::new(Vec::new()),
+                recv_queue: TokioMutex::new(recv.into_iter().collect()),
+            })
+        }
+    }
+    #[async_trait]
+    impl PacketConnection for MockConn {
+        async fn send_packet(&self, packet: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+            self.send_log.lock().await.push(packet.to_vec());
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        async fn recv_packet(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
+            self.recv_queue
+                .lock()
+                .await
+                .pop_front()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("mock recv_queue empty"))
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Every outgoing packet — empty, tiny, mid-sized, or maxed — is written to the inner
+    /// connection as EXACTLY `cell_size` bytes. This is the constant-size invariant.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cell_roundtrip_various_sizes() {
+        let mock = MockConn::new(std::iter::empty());
+        let wrapped = CellPaddingConn::new(mock.clone() as Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, 1280);
+
+        let payloads: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![
+            vec![],
+            vec![0x42],
+            b"hello cell padding".to_vec(),
+            vec![0xCDu8; 100],
+            vec![0xABu8; 1278], // max payload for cell_size = 1280
+        ];
+        for pkt in &payloads {
+            wrapped.send_packet(pkt).await.expect("send");
+        }
+
+        let sent = mock.send_log.lock().await.clone();
+        assert_eq!(sent.len(), payloads.len(), "one cell per send");
+        for (i, cell) in sent.iter().enumerate() {
+            assert_eq!(
+                cell.len(),
+                1280,
+                "cell {i} has constant size; sent payload was {} bytes",
+                payloads[i].len()
+            );
+            // Length-prefix encodes the original payload length.
+            let parsed_len = u16::from_be_bytes([cell[0], cell[1]]) as usize;
+            assert_eq!(parsed_len, payloads[i].len(), "len-prefix matches payload");
+            assert_eq!(
+                &cell[2..2 + payloads[i].len()],
+                &payloads[i][..],
+                "payload bytes are preserved at offset 2"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Roundtrip: feed a recv queue with cells and recover the original payloads through
+    /// [`CellPaddingConn::recv_packet`].
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cell_recv_strips_padding() {
+        // Build three cells by hand, then feed them to the recv queue.
+        let payloads: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![b"first".to_vec(), vec![0u8; 0], (0..=255u8).collect()];
+        let cell_size = 512;
+        let cells: Vec<Vec<u8>> = payloads
+            .iter()
+            .map(|p| {
+                let mut c = vec![0u8; cell_size];
+                let lb = (p.len() as u16).to_be_bytes();
+                c[0] = lb[0];
+                c[1] = lb[1];
+                c[2..2 + p.len()].copy_from_slice(p);
+                c
+            })
+            .collect();
+        let mock = MockConn::new(cells);
+        let wrapped = CellPaddingConn::new(mock as Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, cell_size);
+
+        for expected in &payloads {
+            let got = wrapped.recv_packet().await.expect("recv");
+            assert_eq!(&got, expected, "recovered payload matches");
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Sending a packet larger than `cell_size - 2` is a hard error (the caller must fragment).
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cell_too_large_returns_err() {
+        let mock = MockConn::new(std::iter::empty());
+        let wrapped = CellPaddingConn::new(mock as Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, 256);
+        // 256 - 2 = 254 is the cap; 255 must fail.
+        let oversized = vec![0u8; 255];
+        let err = wrapped.send_packet(&oversized).await.unwrap_err();
+        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("exceeds cell payload capacity") || msg.contains("exceeds"),
+            "expected size-related error, got: {msg}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A received cell shorter than 2 bytes (corrupt; never produced by a well-behaved peer) is
+    /// rejected so we surface the problem rather than silently returning empty.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cell_short_recv_is_rejected() {
+        let mock = MockConn::new([vec![0x05]]);
+        let wrapped = CellPaddingConn::new(mock as Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, 1280);
+        let err = wrapped.recv_packet().await.unwrap_err();
+        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("shorter than"),
+            "expected short-cell error, got: {msg}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// A received cell whose embedded length is larger than the cell capacity is also rejected.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn cell_recv_overlong_len_prefix_is_rejected() {
+        // cell with len = 9999 but only 50 bytes of cell — must be rejected.
+        let mut bad = vec![0u8; 50];
+        let lb = 9999u16.to_be_bytes();
+        bad[0] = lb[0];
+        bad[1] = lb[1];
+        let mock = MockConn::new([bad]);
+        let wrapped = CellPaddingConn::new(mock as Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, 50);
+        let err = wrapped.recv_packet().await.unwrap_err();
+        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
+        assert!(
+            msg.contains("exceeds available cell payload") || msg.contains("exceeds"),
+            "expected overlong-len-prefix error, got: {msg}"
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/aura-cli/src/circuit.rs

@@ -1,38 +1,42 @@
-//! v3.1 multi-hop / onion routing: the **client side** of the 2-hop circuit
-//! `client → entry-relay → exit-server`.
+//! v3.1 / v3.2 multi-hop / onion routing — the **client side** of an N-hop circuit
+//! `client → hop[0] → hop[1] → ... → hop[N-1]`. v3.1 supports `N = 2` (entry + exit);
+//! v3.2 supports `N = 2` OR `N = 3` (entry + middle + exit) plus **per-hop client
+//! certificates** so different hops cannot be linked by certificate CN.
 //!
-//! ## Wire dance
+//! ## Wire dance (recursive)
 //!
-//! 1. The client opens a normal UDP transport connection to the **entry relay** via
-//!    [`UdpClient::connect`]. The relay's cert is mutually authenticated by this **outer** Aura
-//!    handshake.
-//! 2. Through the established outer connection, the client sends one
-//!    [`aura_proto::ControlKind::ExtendBridge`] envelope carrying the literal `IP:port` of the
-//!    downstream **exit server**.
-//! 3. The relay either replies with [`aura_proto::ControlKind::CircuitReady`] (the bridge to the
-//!    exit is up; every subsequent byte travels opaquely) or
-//!    [`aura_proto::ControlKind::CircuitFailed`] (the relay refused — payload is a UTF-8 reason).
-//! 4. Once `CircuitReady` arrives the client opens a **local proxy UDP socket** on loopback and
-//!    runs a second [`UdpClient::connect`] **at that loopback address** — this is the **inner**
-//!    handshake, addressed semantically to the exit-server. A background forwarder ferries every
-//!    datagram between the local proxy socket and the outer relay connection: the relay extracts
-//!    each datagram and ships it to the exit verbatim. The exit therefore runs an ordinary
-//!    [`aura_transport::UdpServer`] accepting one connection whose source address is the relay's
-//!    bridge socket.
+//! For each hop `i` from `0` to `N-1` the dialler:
 //!
-//! Result: traffic is wrapped under **two AEAD layers** — first the exit's session keys (inner
-//! handshake) and again the relay's session keys (outer handshake). The exit knows the client's
-//! certificate CN but not the client's real source IP; the relay knows the client's source IP but
-//! not the destination IP nor a single plaintext byte.
+//! 1. **Outer handshake to `hop[i]`**: opens an Aura UDP transport connection to `hop[i].addr`
+//!    (through any already-stacked proxy/forwarder chain) using `hop[i].proto_cfg`, which carries
+//!    that hop's expected SAN as `server_name` AND the per-hop client cert/key — see [`HopConfig`].
+//! 2. **ExtendBridge** (only if `i < N - 1`): sends one
+//!    [`aura_proto::ControlKind::ExtendBridge`] envelope carrying `hop[i+1].addr` to ask the
+//!    current hop to splice a bridge to the next downstream hop. Waits for
+//!    [`aura_proto::ControlKind::CircuitReady`] (or [`aura_proto::ControlKind::CircuitFailed`]).
+//! 3. **Loopback proxy** (only if `i < N - 1`): binds a local UDP socket and spawns a forwarder
+//!    that splices every datagram between that socket and the outer connection to `hop[i]`. The
+//!    next iteration's outer handshake is addressed at this loopback socket — so the actual bytes
+//!    on the wire travel through the existing tunnel to `hop[i]`, which forwards them through its
+//!    bridge to `hop[i+1]`.
+//! 4. **Final hop** (`i == N - 1`): no ExtendBridge / loopback — the connection returned by step
+//!    1 is the innermost session and authenticates the *exit's* cert. Its `peer_id()` is the exit
+//!    SAN; every subsequent send/recv on the resulting [`CircuitConnection`] is wrapped in
+//!    `N` AEAD layers (one per hop).
 //!
-//! ## Why a local proxy UDP socket?
+//! Result: every IP packet is encrypted N times — once per hop — so the exit knows the client's
+//! certificate CN but not the source IP; every intermediate hop knows the previous hop's address
+//! and the next hop's address but not the destination, and never sees a plaintext byte.
 //!
-//! The Aura UDP transport (`aura_transport::udp`) is built around a [`tokio::net::UdpSocket`]: its
-//! reliable-handshake adapter writes/reads complete datagrams with a 1-byte type prefix
-//! (`0x01` HS, `0x02` DATA). Re-using the transport without that socket would mean re-implementing
-//! the whole reliability layer. The loopback proxy is the smallest hack that lets the inner
-//! [`UdpClient`] talk over its expected datagram interface while every datagram is actually being
-//! tunnelled through the outer relay connection.
+//! ## Per-hop client identity (v3.2)
+//!
+//! The v3.1 dialler used a single `[pki]` cert/key for every hop, so the entry-relay and the exit
+//! both saw the *same* certificate CN — trivially linkable. v3.2 lets the caller pass a different
+//! [`aura_proto::ClientConfig`] for each hop via [`HopConfig`]. The CLI generates an indepedent
+//! UUID-v4 cert per hop with `aura provision-client --circuit-hops N`. With distinct CNs per hop
+//! the only thing that is linkable is the *temporal* correlation of one packet leaving the client
+//! and one packet leaving the exit — which the cell-padding wrapper (see [`crate::cells`]) is the
+//! companion mitigation for.
 
 use std::net::SocketAddr;
 use std::sync::Arc;
@@ -47,42 +51,70 @@ use aura_transport::{UdpClient, UdpConnection, UdpOpts};
 use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
 use tokio::task::JoinHandle;
 
-/// How long the client waits for the relay to reply with [`ControlKind::CircuitReady`] (or
-/// [`ControlKind::CircuitFailed`]) after sending the [`ControlKind::ExtendBridge`] envelope.
+/// How long the client waits for each hop to reply with [`ControlKind::CircuitReady`] after
+/// sending the [`ControlKind::ExtendBridge`] envelope.
 const READY_TIMEOUT_SECS: u64 = 5;
 
-/// An established 2-hop circuit: it is **literally** a [`UdpConnection`] in disguise. The inner
-/// connection's outgoing datagrams go to a local proxy socket, which forwards them through the
-/// outer relay connection to the exit. From the inner handshake / data exchange's point of view
-/// nothing is special — it is talking to a normal Aura UDP server.
+/// Per-hop dial configuration. One instance per hop in the circuit; the order matches the wire
+/// order (`hops[0]` = entry, `hops[N-1]` = exit).
 ///
-/// The two background tasks (proxy forwarders) and the outer connection are owned here, so dropping
-/// the circuit tears everything down in order.
+/// `proto_cfg.server_name` is the SAN the verifier checks on **this hop's** certificate during the
+/// outer Aura handshake. `proto_cfg.client_cert_pem` / `proto_cfg.client_key_pem` is the client
+/// identity presented **to this hop** — different per hop in v3.2 so the entry and the exit cannot
+/// link the two handshakes by certificate CN.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct HopConfig {
+    /// Wire address of this hop (already resolved to `IP:port`).
+    pub addr: SocketAddr,
+    /// Aura client config for the handshake to *this* hop.
+    pub proto_cfg: ClientConfig,
+}
+
+impl HopConfig {
+    /// Convenience: build a hop using the same client config as the rest of the circuit. Used by
+    /// the v3.1 / `CircuitHop::Addr` back-compat path where the caller wants every hop to use the
+    /// global `[pki]` cert/key (matching the v3.1 behaviour).
+    pub fn from_shared(addr: SocketAddr, proto_cfg: ClientConfig) -> Self {
+        Self { addr, proto_cfg }
+    }
+}
+
+/// An established multi-hop circuit. The inner [`UdpConnection`]'s outgoing datagrams travel
+/// through a chain of loopback proxies + outer relay connections; from the inner handshake / data
+/// exchange's point of view nothing is special — it is talking to a normal Aura UDP server.
+///
+/// The outer connections and forwarder tasks are owned here so dropping the circuit tears
+/// everything down in order.
 pub struct CircuitConnection {
-    /// The inner UDP connection (target of the second handshake addressed to the exit). All
-    /// `send_packet` / `recv_packet` go through this; the proxy forwarder splices the bytes onto
-    /// the outer relay connection.
+    /// The innermost UDP connection (target of the final hop's handshake). All `send_packet` /
+    /// `recv_packet` calls delegate to it; the forwarder chain splices its bytes onto the outer
+    /// hops in order.
     inner: UdpConnection,
-    /// Outer relay connection — pinned alive for the lifetime of the circuit. The forwarder owns
-    /// clones, but holding it here means the outer is dropped at exactly the same time as `Self`.
-    _outer_conn_holder: Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
-    /// Background task: local proxy socket ↔ outer relay connection. Aborted in [`Drop`].
-    forwarder: JoinHandle<()>,
-    /// Local proxy socket kept alive for the forwarder's lifetime (the forwarder also holds an
-    /// `Arc<UdpSocket>` clone, but this prevents close-on-last-clone races during shutdown).
-    _proxy_socket: Arc<UdpSocket>,
+    /// Every outer hop connection, in order (`hop[0]` first). Pinned alive for the lifetime of the
+    /// circuit; the per-hop forwarder tasks own clones, but holding the originals here means every
+    /// outer is dropped at exactly the same time as `Self`.
+    _outer_conns: Vec<Arc<dyn PacketConnection>>,
+    /// One forwarder task per intermediate hop (so `N - 1` tasks for an N-hop circuit). Aborted in
+    /// [`Drop`] so dropping the circuit cleans them up.
+    forwarders: Vec<JoinHandle<()>>,
+    /// The chain of loopback proxy sockets (one per intermediate hop). Held here so they outlive
+    /// the forwarders that read/write through them; the forwarder also holds an `Arc<UdpSocket>`
+    /// clone, but this prevents a close-on-last-clone race during shutdown.
+    _proxy_sockets: Vec<Arc<UdpSocket>>,
 }
 
 impl Drop for CircuitConnection {
     fn drop(&mut self) {
-        self.forwarder.abort();
+        for f in &self.forwarders {
+            f.abort();
+        }
     }
 }
 
 impl CircuitConnection {
-    /// The verified peer Common Name as learned during the **inner** handshake. This is the
-    /// **exit-server's** identity (NOT the relay's) — the whole point of multi-hop is that the
-    /// inner handshake authenticates the exit through the relay opaquely.
+    /// The verified peer Common Name as learned during the **innermost** handshake. This is the
+    /// **exit-server's** identity (NOT any intermediate hop) — the whole point of multi-hop is that
+    /// the inner handshake authenticates the exit through every relay opaquely.
     #[must_use]
     pub fn peer_id(&self) -> Option<&str> {
         self.inner.peer_id()
@@ -100,7 +132,7 @@ impl CircuitConnection {
 impl PacketConnection for CircuitConnection {
     async fn send_packet(&self, packet: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         // Delegate to the inner UdpConnection — the proxy forwarder picks up its outgoing
-        // datagrams from the local proxy socket and tunnels them through the outer relay.
+        // datagrams from the innermost loopback proxy socket and tunnels them through the chain.
         self.inner.send_packet(packet).await
     }
 
@@ -109,29 +141,262 @@ impl PacketConnection for CircuitConnection {
     }
 }
 
-/// Build a 2-hop circuit `client → hops[0] (entry relay) → hops[1] (exit server)` and return it
-/// as a [`CircuitConnection`].
+/// Build an N-hop circuit `client → hops[0] → hops[1] → ... → hops[N-1]`. Returns the established
+/// [`CircuitConnection`].
 ///
-/// Both hops are reached via the [`UdpClient`] transport in v3.1. `proto_cfg.server_name` is used
-/// by the **inner** handshake to verify the EXIT's certificate SAN. The relay's own cert is also
-/// CA-verified by the outer handshake; pass [`dial_circuit_with_relay_name`] when the relay's SAN
-/// differs from the exit's.
+/// `hops.len()` must be in `{2, 3}` — v3.1 accepted only 2; v3.2 extends to 3. Each entry's
+/// [`HopConfig::proto_cfg`] supplies:
+///
+/// * The SAN expected on that hop's server certificate (`proto_cfg.server_name`).
+/// * The client cert/key presented **to that hop** (`proto_cfg.client_cert_pem` /
+///   `proto_cfg.client_key_pem`). Distinct per hop = identity-unlinkable v3.2 behaviour.
 ///
 /// # Errors
-/// * The outer UDP connection to the entry relay failed.
-/// * The relay refused (`CircuitFailed`) or did not reply within [`READY_TIMEOUT_SECS`] seconds.
-/// * The inner Aura handshake (through the relay) failed (bad exit cert chain, SAN mismatch, etc.).
+/// * Any outer UDP connection failed.
+/// * Any intermediate hop refused (`CircuitFailed`) or did not reply within
+///   [`READY_TIMEOUT_SECS`] seconds.
+/// * The inner Aura handshake to the exit failed (bad exit cert chain, SAN mismatch, etc.).
 pub async fn dial_circuit(
+    hops: &[HopConfig],
+    udp_opts: UdpOpts,
+) -> anyhow::Result<CircuitConnection> {
+    if hops.len() < 2 || hops.len() > 3 {
+        bail!(
+            "v3.2 multi-hop supports 2 or 3 hops (entry, [middle,] exit); got {}",
+            hops.len()
+        );
+    }
+
+    // We build the chain iteratively. At each iteration the "current outer" is what we are
+    // currently dialing through; for the first hop it is a literal `UdpClient::connect`, for every
+    // subsequent hop it is a loopback proxy + forwarder splicing onto the previous outer.
+    let mut outer_conns: Vec<Arc<dyn PacketConnection>> = Vec::with_capacity(hops.len() - 1);
+    let mut forwarders: Vec<JoinHandle<()>> = Vec::with_capacity(hops.len() - 1);
+    let mut proxy_sockets: Vec<Arc<UdpSocket>> = Vec::with_capacity(hops.len() - 1);
+
+    // Step 1: dial the very first hop directly via UDP. This is the only hop whose outer handshake
+    // exits the client process as a real datagram on the OS network stack.
+    let entry = &hops[0];
+    let first = UdpClient::connect(entry.addr, entry.proto_cfg.clone(), udp_opts)
+        .await
+        .with_context(|| format!("dial entry hop at {}", entry.addr))?;
+    let mut current_outer: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = first.into_dyn();
+
+    // For every *intermediate* hop (every hop except the last) we:
+    //   - ask it to bridge to the next hop via ExtendBridge,
+    //   - wait for CircuitReady,
+    //   - bring up a loopback proxy + forwarder so the next outer handshake travels through
+    //     `current_outer`,
+    //   - then re-dial the *next* hop via that loopback proxy and update `current_outer`.
+    //
+    // After the loop, `current_outer` is the outer connection to `hops[N-2]` and the next dial
+    // (step 6 below) is the inner handshake to `hops[N-1]` (the exit). We need to keep
+    // `current_outer` itself in `outer_conns` too — it is the outermost of the inner-handshake's
+    // pipe.
+    for i in 0..hops.len() - 1 {
+        let next = &hops[i + 1];
+
+        // 2. Tell the current hop to splice onto `next.addr`.
+        let payload = encode_extend_bridge(next.addr);
+        let envelope = encode_control_envelope(ControlKind::ExtendBridge, &payload);
+        current_outer
+            .send_packet(&envelope)
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("send ExtendBridge to hop[{}] at {}", i, hops[i].addr))?;
+
+        // 3. Wait for CircuitReady from this hop (or CircuitFailed = bail). The remote may send
+        //    unrelated envelopes (CRL pushes etc.) in front of ours; ignore until our envelope
+        //    arrives or the deadline elapses.
+        let ready_deadline =
+            tokio::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(READY_TIMEOUT_SECS);
+        loop {
+            let now = tokio::time::Instant::now();
+            if now >= ready_deadline {
+                bail!(
+                    "timeout waiting for CircuitReady from hop[{}] at {}",
+                    i,
+                    hops[i].addr
+                );
+            }
+            let remaining = ready_deadline - now;
+            let pkt = tokio::time::timeout(remaining, current_outer.recv_packet())
+                .await
+                .map_err(|_| {
+                    anyhow!(
+                        "timeout waiting for CircuitReady from hop[{}] at {}",
+                        i,
+                        hops[i].addr
+                    )
+                })?
+                .with_context(|| format!("recv from hop[{}] at {}", i, hops[i].addr))?;
+            match decode_control_envelope(&pkt) {
+                Ok(Some((ControlKind::CircuitReady, _))) => break,
+                Ok(Some((ControlKind::CircuitFailed, reason))) => {
+                    let r = String::from_utf8_lossy(&reason);
+                    bail!("hop[{}] at {} refused circuit: {}", i, hops[i].addr, r);
+                }
+                Ok(Some((other, _))) => {
+                    tracing::debug!(
+                        hop = i,
+                        kind = ?other,
+                        "ignoring unexpected control envelope while waiting for CircuitReady"
+                    );
+                    continue;
+                }
+                Ok(None) => {
+                    tracing::debug!(
+                        hop = i,
+                        "ignoring non-control packet from hop before CircuitReady"
+                    );
+                    continue;
+                }
+                Err(e) => {
+                    tracing::debug!(
+                        hop = i,
+                        error = %e,
+                        "malformed envelope from hop before CircuitReady"
+                    );
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // 4. Bring up the local proxy UDP socket. The next iteration's UdpClient::connect will
+        //    target this address; the forwarder below splices every datagram between the proxy
+        //    socket and the current outer connection.
+        let proxy_socket = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0")
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| format!("bind loopback proxy for hop[{}] -> hop[{}]", i, i + 1))?;
+        let proxy_addr = proxy_socket
+            .local_addr()
+            .context("read local proxy address")?;
+        let proxy_socket = Arc::new(proxy_socket);
+
+        // 5. Spawn the forwarder BEFORE running the next outer handshake — the handshake's first
+        //    datagram must already be flowing while it is being written.
+        let outer_for_send = Arc::clone(&current_outer);
+        let outer_for_recv = Arc::clone(&current_outer);
+        let proxy_for_send = Arc::clone(&proxy_socket);
+        let proxy_for_recv = Arc::clone(&proxy_socket);
+        let hop_idx = i;
+        let forwarder = tokio::spawn(async move {
+            // Source address of the next-hop UdpClient, learned from its first datagram on the
+            // proxy socket. We need it to know where to deliver `outer.recv_packet` payloads back.
+            let inner_peer: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<SocketAddr>>> =
+                Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None));
+
+            // Task A: proxy.recv_from -> outer.send_packet
+            let inner_peer_a = Arc::clone(&inner_peer);
+            let to_outer = async move {
+                let mut buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
+                loop {
+                    let (n, from) = match proxy_for_recv.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
+                        Ok(v) => v,
+                        Err(_) => break,
+                    };
+                    {
+                        let mut latch = inner_peer_a.lock().await;
+                        if latch.is_none() {
+                            *latch = Some(from);
+                        }
+                    }
+                    if outer_for_send.send_packet(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() {
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            };
+            // Task B: outer.recv_packet -> proxy.send_to(inner_peer_addr)
+            let inner_peer_b = Arc::clone(&inner_peer);
+            let from_outer = async move {
+                loop {
+                    let pkt = match outer_for_recv.recv_packet().await {
+                        Ok(p) => p,
+                        Err(_) => break,
+                    };
+                    let dest = { *inner_peer_b.lock().await };
+                    if let Some(dest) = dest {
+                        if proxy_for_send.send_to(&pkt, dest).await.is_err() {
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                    // Else: next-hop UdpClient has not sent its first datagram yet; drop. The
+                    // reliable adapter will retransmit on its RTO timer. The race window is tiny.
+                }
+            };
+            tokio::select! {
+                _ = to_outer => {}
+                _ = from_outer => {}
+            }
+            tracing::debug!(hop = hop_idx, "circuit forwarder exited");
+        });
+
+        // 6. Move `current_outer` into our owned list, spawn the forwarder + socket into theirs,
+        //    then dial the *next* hop through the loopback proxy. The dial returns the new
+        //    `current_outer`.
+        outer_conns.push(current_outer);
+        forwarders.push(forwarder);
+        proxy_sockets.push(Arc::clone(&proxy_socket));
+
+        // 7. Dial the next hop through the proxy. For an intermediate next hop this becomes the
+        //    new `current_outer`; for the final hop (last iteration) it is the *inner* connection
+        //    we return wrapped in `CircuitConnection`.
+        let is_last = i == hops.len() - 2;
+        let next_conn = UdpClient::connect(proxy_addr, next.proto_cfg.clone(), udp_opts)
+            .await
+            .with_context(|| {
+                format!(
+                    "{} handshake to hop[{}] at {} through hop[{}]",
+                    if is_last { "inner" } else { "intermediate" },
+                    i + 1,
+                    next.addr,
+                    i
+                )
+            })?;
+        if is_last {
+            // The innermost session: wrap it in CircuitConnection along with every outer + proxy
+            // we own. Note: we do NOT push next_conn into outer_conns — it becomes `inner`.
+            return Ok(CircuitConnection {
+                inner: next_conn,
+                _outer_conns: outer_conns,
+                forwarders,
+                _proxy_sockets: proxy_sockets,
+            });
+        } else {
+            // Promote to dyn for the next loop iteration.
+            current_outer = next_conn.into_dyn();
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Unreachable: the loop always returns when `is_last` is true (the last intermediate
+    // iteration always produces the inner session for the exit).
+    unreachable!("dial_circuit loop must return on the final hop")
+}
+
+/// v3.1 back-compat shim: build hops from a flat `[SocketAddr]` list using a shared
+/// [`ClientConfig`] for every hop and call [`dial_circuit`]. Useful for code paths that have a
+/// single proto_cfg (e.g. an old `[client] sni`).
+///
+/// Behaviour matches v3.1 exactly when given exactly 2 hops; with 3 hops it now also works (every
+/// hop uses the same cert / key, i.e. NOT identity-unlinkable — use the per-hop variant for that).
+pub async fn dial_circuit_shared_cfg(
     hops: &[SocketAddr],
     proto_cfg: ClientConfig,
     udp_opts: UdpOpts,
 ) -> anyhow::Result<CircuitConnection> {
-    dial_circuit_with_relay_name(hops, proto_cfg, udp_opts, None).await
+    let hop_cfgs: Vec<HopConfig> = hops
+        .iter()
+        .map(|a| HopConfig::from_shared(*a, proto_cfg.clone()))
+        .collect();
+    dial_circuit(&hop_cfgs, udp_opts).await
 }
 
-/// Variant of [`dial_circuit`] letting the caller override the SAN expected on the relay's cert
-/// (the outer handshake) independently of the exit's expected SAN (`proto_cfg.server_name`, used
-/// by the inner handshake). See [`dial_circuit`] for the high-level wire dance.
+/// Variant of [`dial_circuit_shared_cfg`] letting the caller override the SAN expected on the
+/// **first hop's** cert (the relay) independently of the exit's expected SAN
+/// (`proto_cfg.server_name`, used by the inner handshake). v3.1 kept this for the loopback test
+/// which uses a different SAN per role.
+///
+/// Equivalent to v3.1 behaviour. For arbitrary per-hop overrides, build a `Vec<HopConfig>`
+/// directly and call [`dial_circuit`].
 pub async fn dial_circuit_with_relay_name(
     hops: &[SocketAddr],
     proto_cfg: ClientConfig,
@@ -140,151 +405,17 @@ pub async fn dial_circuit_with_relay_name(
 ) -> anyhow::Result<CircuitConnection> {
     if hops.len() != 2 {
         bail!(
-            "v3.1 multi-hop requires exactly 2 hops (entry, exit), got {}",
+            "dial_circuit_with_relay_name requires exactly 2 hops (entry, exit); got {}",
             hops.len()
         );
     }
-    let entry = hops[0];
-
-    // 1) Dial entry via the existing UDP transport. The outer mutual-auth handshake against the
-    //    relay's certificate runs here; when `relay_server_name` is supplied the verifier
-    //    validates the relay's SAN against that name instead of the exit's.
-    let mut outer_cfg = proto_cfg.clone();
+    let mut entry_cfg = proto_cfg.clone();
     if let Some(name) = relay_server_name {
-        outer_cfg.server_name = name.to_string();
+        entry_cfg.server_name = name.to_string();
     }
-    let outer = UdpClient::connect(entry, outer_cfg, udp_opts)
-        .await
-        .with_context(|| format!("dial entry relay at {entry}"))?;
-    let outer: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = outer.into_dyn();
-
-    // 2) Send the ExtendBridge control envelope describing the downstream exit address.
-    let exit = hops[1];
-    let payload = encode_extend_bridge(exit);
-    let envelope = encode_control_envelope(ControlKind::ExtendBridge, &payload);
-    outer
-        .send_packet(&envelope)
-        .await
-        .context("send ExtendBridge to relay")?;
-
-    // 3) Wait for CircuitReady (with a hard timeout). The relay may send unrelated control
-    //    envelopes in front of ours (e.g. a CRL push from the v2 path) — those are ignored until
-    //    the expected envelope arrives or the deadline elapses.
-    let ready_deadline =
-        tokio::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(READY_TIMEOUT_SECS);
-    loop {
-        let now = tokio::time::Instant::now();
-        if now >= ready_deadline {
-            bail!("timeout waiting for CircuitReady from relay at {entry}");
-        }
-        let remaining = ready_deadline - now;
-        let pkt = tokio::time::timeout(remaining, outer.recv_packet())
-            .await
-            .map_err(|_| anyhow!("timeout waiting for CircuitReady from relay at {entry}"))?
-            .context("recv from entry relay")?;
-        match decode_control_envelope(&pkt) {
-            Ok(Some((ControlKind::CircuitReady, _))) => break,
-            Ok(Some((ControlKind::CircuitFailed, reason))) => {
-                let r = String::from_utf8_lossy(&reason);
-                bail!("relay refused circuit: {r}");
-            }
-            Ok(Some((other, _))) => {
-                tracing::debug!(
-                    kind = ?other,
-                    "ignoring unexpected control envelope while waiting for CircuitReady"
-                );
-                continue;
-            }
-            Ok(None) => {
-                tracing::debug!("ignoring non-control packet from relay before CircuitReady");
-                continue;
-            }
-            Err(e) => {
-                tracing::debug!(error = %e, "malformed envelope from relay before CircuitReady");
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // 4) Bring up the local proxy UDP socket. The inner UdpClient will `connect()` to its address;
-    //    every datagram it sends goes through the forwarder below to the outer relay connection,
-    //    and every datagram the relay forwards from the exit is replayed back to the inner socket.
-    let proxy_socket = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0")
-        .await
-        .context("bind local circuit proxy socket")?;
-    let proxy_addr = proxy_socket
-        .local_addr()
-        .context("read local proxy address")?;
-    let proxy_socket = Arc::new(proxy_socket);
-
-    // 5) Spawn the forwarder BEFORE running the inner handshake — the handshake's first datagram
-    //    must already be flowing while it is being written.
-    let outer_for_send = Arc::clone(&outer);
-    let outer_for_recv = Arc::clone(&outer);
-    let proxy_for_send = Arc::clone(&proxy_socket);
-    let proxy_for_recv = Arc::clone(&proxy_socket);
-    let forwarder = tokio::spawn(async move {
-        // Source address of the inner UdpClient, learned from its first datagram on the proxy
-        // socket. We need it to know where to deliver `outer.recv_packet` payloads back.
-        let inner_peer: Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<Option<SocketAddr>>> =
-            Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(None));
-
-        // Task A: proxy.recv_from → outer.send_packet
-        let inner_peer_a = Arc::clone(&inner_peer);
-        let to_outer = async move {
-            let mut buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
-            loop {
-                let (n, from) = match proxy_for_recv.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
-                    Ok(v) => v,
-                    Err(_) => break,
-                };
-                {
-                    let mut latch = inner_peer_a.lock().await;
-                    if latch.is_none() {
-                        *latch = Some(from);
-                    }
-                }
-                if outer_for_send.send_packet(&buf[..n]).await.is_err() {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-        };
-        // Task B: outer.recv_packet → proxy.send_to(inner_peer_addr)
-        let inner_peer_b = Arc::clone(&inner_peer);
-        let from_outer = async move {
-            loop {
-                let pkt = match outer_for_recv.recv_packet().await {
-                    Ok(p) => p,
-                    Err(_) => break,
-                };
-                let dest = { *inner_peer_b.lock().await };
-                if let Some(dest) = dest {
-                    if proxy_for_send.send_to(&pkt, dest).await.is_err() {
-                        break;
-                    }
-                }
-                // Else: the inner UdpClient has not sent its first datagram yet; drop. (The
-                // reliable adapter will retransmit on its RTO timer.) This race window is tiny —
-                // we always spawn the forwarder before `UdpClient::connect`.
-            }
-        };
-        tokio::select! {
-            _ = to_outer => {}
-            _ = from_outer => {}
-        }
-    });
-
-    // 6) Inner Aura handshake addressed to the EXIT, via the local proxy. The peer_id we capture
-    //    is the exit's verified CN (the core invariant: the inner handshake authenticates the
-    //    exit, not the relay).
-    let inner = UdpClient::connect(proxy_addr, proto_cfg, udp_opts)
-        .await
-        .context("inner handshake to exit through relay")?;
-
-    Ok(CircuitConnection {
-        inner,
-        _outer_conn_holder: outer,
-        forwarder,
-        _proxy_socket: proxy_socket,
-    })
+    let hop_cfgs = vec![
+        HopConfig::from_shared(hops[0], entry_cfg),
+        HopConfig::from_shared(hops[1], proto_cfg),
+    ];
+    dial_circuit(&hop_cfgs, udp_opts).await
 }

crates/aura-cli/src/client.rs

@@ -97,28 +97,44 @@ pub async fn run(config_path: &Path, admin_socket: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     let routes = Arc::new(RwLock::new(table));
     let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
 
-    // Dial: when [client.circuit] is enabled, build a 2-hop circuit `client → entry-relay → exit`
-    // via [`circuit::dial_circuit`]. Otherwise fall back to the v2 single-hop dial across the
-    // configured [transport] order. In both cases the result is a uniform `Arc<dyn PacketConnection>`
-    // so the downstream router does not care which path was taken.
-    let (conn, mode) = if cfg.circuit.enabled {
-        let hops = cfg
-            .circuit_hops()
-            .context("parsing [client.circuit] hops")?;
+    // Dial: when [client.circuit] is enabled, build an N-hop circuit (v3.1: N=2; v3.2: N=2 or 3)
+    // via [`circuit::dial_circuit`] with per-hop client configs. Otherwise fall back to the v2
+    // single-hop dial across the configured [transport] order. In both cases the result is a
+    // uniform `Arc<dyn PacketConnection>` so the downstream router does not care which path was
+    // taken.
+    let (conn, mode) = if cfg.client.circuit.enabled {
+        let hop_cfgs = cfg
+            .build_circuit_hop_configs()
+            .context("building [client.circuit] hop configs")?;
+        let hop_count = hop_cfgs.len();
         tracing::info!(
-            entry = %hops[0],
-            exit = %hops[1],
-            "building v3.1 2-hop circuit"
+            hops = hop_count,
+            entry = %hop_cfgs[0].addr,
+            exit = %hop_cfgs[hop_count - 1].addr,
+            cell_padding = cfg.client.circuit.cell_padding,
+            cell_size = cfg.client.circuit.cell_size,
+            "building v3.2 multi-hop circuit"
         );
-        let circuit_conn = circuit::dial_circuit(&hops, proto_cfg.clone(), dial_cfg.udp)
+        let circuit_conn = circuit::dial_circuit(&hop_cfgs, dial_cfg.udp)
             .await
-            .context("building multi-hop circuit (v3.1)")?;
+            .context("building multi-hop circuit (v3.2)")?;
         let peer_id = circuit_conn.peer_id().map(str::to_owned);
         tracing::info!(
             peer = ?peer_id,
-            "v3.1 circuit established (inner handshake authenticated the EXIT server)"
+            "v3.2 circuit established (inner handshake authenticated the EXIT server)"
         );
-        (circuit_conn.into_dyn(), TransportMode::Udp)
+        // v3.2 cell padding: wrap the circuit in a constant-size cell stream so on-wire bytes do
+        // not leak per-packet size. The exit's [server] cell_padding_for_circuit_clients flag
+        // MUST match.
+        let conn: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = if cfg.client.circuit.cell_padding {
+            Arc::new(crate::cells::CellPaddingConn::new(
+                circuit_conn.into_dyn(),
+                cfg.client.circuit.cell_size,
+            ))
+        } else {
+            circuit_conn.into_dyn()
+        };
+        (conn, TransportMode::Udp)
     } else {
         // Each transport runs the inner Aura mutual-auth handshake; the winner is returned along
         // with which mode carried it. (The trait object does not surface the verified server CN;

crates/aura-cli/src/config.rs

@@ -135,9 +135,18 @@ pub struct ServerSection {
     /// written. Default `false` (verbose). See [`crate::no_logs`].
     #[serde(default)]
     pub no_logs: bool,
+    /// v3.2: when `true`, **every** accepted UDP connection that ends up serving as a normal VPN
+    /// client (i.e. not bridged through the relay path) is wrapped in
+    /// [`crate::cells::CellPaddingConn`] using `[server.relay] cell_size` bytes per cell. This is
+    /// the server-side complement to `[client.circuit] cell_padding`: the **exit** of a multi-hop
+    /// circuit MUST enable this so its inner-handshake session decodes the client's padded cells.
+    /// Default `false` (v3.1-compatible). Operators running an exit-only server with cell-padded
+    /// circuit clients should set this to `true`.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub cell_padding_for_circuit_clients: bool,
 }
 
-/// `[server.relay]` section: v3.1 multi-hop / onion routing.
+/// `[server.relay]` section: v3.1 / v3.2 multi-hop / onion routing.
 ///
 /// When `enabled = true`, an accepted connection is **not** immediately registered with the
 /// [`crate::server_router::ServerRouter`]. Instead the server listens (for a short window) for a
@@ -149,16 +158,44 @@ pub struct ServerSection {
 ///
 /// Omitting the section (the default) gives the v2 behaviour: every accepted connection is a
 /// VPN client and the relay path is dead code.
+///
+/// ## v3.2 `cell_padding`
+///
+/// When `cell_padding = true`, this server treats every bridged client connection as a
+/// constant-size cell stream (see [`crate::cells`]) — every accepted [`aura_proto::PacketConnection`]
+/// on the relay path is wrapped in [`crate::cells::CellPaddingConn`] using `cell_size` bytes per
+/// cell (default 1280). The **client must enable the matching flag in `[client.circuit]`** or the
+/// transport bytes will not be a valid cell stream. Default `false` (v3.1-compatible).
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(default)]
 pub struct RelaySection {
     /// Master switch. `false` (default) keeps the v2 behaviour intact.
     pub enabled: bool,
-    /// Whitelist of allowed downstream exit addresses (`IP:port`). DNS hostnames are NOT resolved
-    /// in v3.1 — they are logged as a warning and ignored. An empty list means "all addresses
-    /// allowed", which is dangerous (open relay); the runtime logs a warning when this combination
-    /// is detected.
+    /// Whitelist of allowed downstream exit destinations. Each entry is either:
+    ///
+    /// * A literal `IP:port` — exact match.
+    /// * A CIDR `IP/prefix` — matches any port at any IP in the subnet (v3.2).
+    /// * A CIDR with explicit port `IP/prefix:port` — matches the port on any IP in the subnet
+    ///   (v3.2). For IPv6 the syntax is `[2001:db8::/32]:443`; bare-IPv6 syntax mirrors the
+    ///   `SocketAddr` brackets convention.
+    ///
+    /// DNS hostnames are NOT resolved (logged at WARN and skipped). An empty list means "all
+    /// addresses allowed" — dangerous (open relay); the runtime logs a warning when this is
+    /// detected.
     pub allow_extend_to: Vec<String>,
+    /// When `true`, every relayed connection's bytes pass through [`crate::cells::CellPaddingConn`]
+    /// at `cell_size`. The client MUST enable the matching flag. Default `false`.
+    pub cell_padding: bool,
+    /// Cell size for [`crate::cells::CellPaddingConn`] when `cell_padding = true`. Default 1280.
+    /// MUST match the client's `[client.circuit] cell_size`.
+    #[serde(default = "default_cell_size")]
+    pub cell_size: usize,
+}
+
+/// Default cell size (bytes) for the cell-padding wrapper. 1280 is the IPv6 minimum MTU and a
+/// commonly-seen HTTPS path MTU, so it is unlikely to look suspicious on the wire.
+fn default_cell_size() -> usize {
+    crate::cells::CellPaddingConn::DEFAULT_CELL_SIZE
 }
 
 /// `[server.outer_cert]` section: v3 explicit outer-TLS cert/key for the QUIC and TCP transports.
@@ -274,7 +311,7 @@ pub struct ServerMimicrySection {
 /// Top-level `client.toml` document.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ClientConfigFile {
-    /// `[client]` section: identity and server address.
+    /// `[client]` section: identity and server address (and v3.1 / v3.2 `[client.circuit]` sub).
     pub client: ClientSection,
     /// `[pki]` section: CA + leaf cert/key file paths.
     pub pki: PkiSection,
@@ -286,26 +323,106 @@ pub struct ClientConfigFile {
     /// `[transport]` section: fallback order and per-transport ports/options.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub transport: TransportSection,
-    /// `[client.circuit]` section: v3.1 multi-hop / onion routing dial. When `enabled = true`,
-    /// instead of dialing the server directly via [`aura_transport::dial`], the client builds a
-    /// 2-hop circuit `client → entry-relay → exit-server` from `hops`. Default `enabled = false`.
-    #[serde(default)]
-    pub circuit: CircuitSection,
 }
 
-/// `[client.circuit]` section: v3.1 multi-hop / onion routing on the client.
+impl ClientConfigFile {
+    /// Shorthand accessor for `[client.circuit]`. The section lives on the [`ClientSection`] so
+    /// the TOML key path matches (`client.circuit`); callers conventionally write `cfg.circuit`.
+    pub fn circuit(&self) -> &CircuitSection {
+        &self.client.circuit
+    }
+}
+
+/// `[client.circuit]` section: v3.1 / v3.2 multi-hop / onion routing on the client.
 ///
-/// See the module-level docs of [`crate::circuit`] for the wire protocol. When `enabled = true`,
-/// `hops` MUST contain exactly two `IP:port` entries — the entry relay (UDP) and the exit server
-/// (UDP). v3.1 supports only UDP transport for both hops; configuring `enabled = true` with a
-/// non-UDP transport order is a hard error at dial time (the dial helper checks the order).
+/// See the module-level docs of [`crate::circuit`] for the wire protocol.
+///
+/// ## Two hop formats (both accepted)
+///
+/// **v3.1 flat** (back-compat — every hop uses the global `[pki]` cert/key):
+///
+/// ```toml
+/// [client.circuit]
+/// enabled = true
+/// hops = ["198.51.100.5:443", "203.0.113.10:443"]
+/// ```
+///
+/// **v3.2 per-hop** (each hop carries its own client cert so the entry and the exit cannot
+/// link the two handshakes by certificate CN):
+///
+/// ```toml
+/// [client.circuit]
+/// enabled = true
+///
+/// [[client.circuit.hops]]
+/// addr      = "198.51.100.5:443"
+/// cert_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/entry.crt"
+/// key_path  = "~/.config/aura/circuit/entry.key"
+///
+/// [[client.circuit.hops]]
+/// addr      = "203.0.113.10:443"
+/// cert_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/exit.crt"
+/// key_path  = "~/.config/aura/circuit/exit.key"
+/// ```
+///
+/// In v3.2 the `hops` array MAY also mix string entries with table entries — the string entries
+/// fall back to the global `[pki]` cert/key, as in v3.1.
+///
+/// `hops.len()` must be 2 OR 3 (v3.2 extended). v3.1 only accepted 2.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(default)]
 pub struct CircuitSection {
     /// Master switch. `false` (default) keeps the v2 single-hop dial path.
     pub enabled: bool,
-    /// Ordered list of hops: `[entry_relay, exit_server]`. Exactly two literal `IP:port` entries.
-    pub hops: Vec<String>,
+    /// Ordered list of hops. Each entry is either a literal `"IP:port"` string (v3.1 flat
+    /// format — uses the global `[pki]` cert/key) or a table with per-hop overrides:
+    /// `{ addr, cert_path, key_path, server_name? }` (v3.2). Serde's `untagged` enum
+    /// resolves the two formats transparently.
+    pub hops: Vec<CircuitHop>,
+    /// v3.2: pad every outgoing packet to a constant `cell_size`-byte cell before sending it
+    /// through the circuit. Must match the relay's `[server.relay] cell_padding`. Default `false`.
+    pub cell_padding: bool,
+    /// v3.2: cell size in bytes when `cell_padding = true`. Default 1280. Must match the relay's
+    /// `[server.relay] cell_size`.
+    #[serde(default = "default_cell_size")]
+    pub cell_size: usize,
+}
+
+/// One entry in `[[client.circuit.hops]]`. Accepts either a flat `"IP:port"` string (v3.1 back
+/// compat — uses the global `[pki]` cert/key for the outer handshake to this hop) or a table with
+/// per-hop cert/key overrides (v3.2). The two variants are distinguished by serde's
+/// `#[serde(untagged)]`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(untagged)]
+pub enum CircuitHop {
+    /// v3.1 flat: just the wire `IP:port`. The hop's outer handshake uses the client's global
+    /// `[pki]` cert/key, same as every other hop — NOT identity-unlinkable.
+    Addr(String),
+    /// v3.2 full: `IP:port` plus per-hop cert/key paths. The optional `server_name` overrides the
+    /// SAN expected on this hop's server cert (defaults to the global `[client] sni`).
+    Full {
+        /// Wire address of the hop.
+        addr: String,
+        /// PEM file holding this client's certificate for the handshake to **this hop**. Path may
+        /// begin with `~`.
+        cert_path: PathBuf,
+        /// PEM file holding the matching PKCS#8 private key. Path may begin with `~`.
+        key_path: PathBuf,
+        /// Optional SAN expected on the hop's server cert. When omitted, the global `[client] sni`
+        /// is used (matching v3.1 behaviour where every hop's SAN comes from one place).
+        #[serde(default)]
+        server_name: Option<String>,
+    },
+}
+
+impl CircuitHop {
+    /// The wire address of this hop, regardless of variant.
+    pub fn addr(&self) -> &str {
+        match self {
+            Self::Addr(s) => s.as_str(),
+            Self::Full { addr, .. } => addr.as_str(),
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /// `[client]` section.
@@ -332,6 +449,12 @@ pub struct ClientSection {
     /// See [`crate::dial_targets::build_dial_targets`].
     #[serde(default)]
     pub bridges: Vec<String>,
+    /// `[client.circuit]` sub-section: v3.1 / v3.2 multi-hop / onion routing dial. When
+    /// `enabled = true`, instead of dialing the server directly via [`aura_transport::dial`], the
+    /// client builds an N-hop circuit (N = 2 or 3) from `hops`. Default `enabled = false`.
+    /// Living inside `[client]` matches the TOML path operators write: `[client.circuit]`.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub circuit: CircuitSection,
 }
 
 /// `[tunnel]` section of `client.toml`.
@@ -859,23 +982,50 @@ impl ServerConfigFile {
         TcpOpts::default()
     }
 
-    /// Parse `[server.relay] allow_extend_to` into a vector of [`SocketAddr`]s, skipping (with a
-    /// `warn` log) any entries that are not bare `IP:port` strings. v3.1 does NOT perform DNS
-    /// resolution; the operator must supply literal IPs.
+    /// Parse `[server.relay] allow_extend_to` into a vector of [`SocketAddr`]s (v3.1 back
+    /// compat). Use [`Self::relay_allow_rules`] if you also want to honour CIDR entries
+    /// introduced in v3.2.
     ///
-    /// Returns the parsed addresses paired with their original strings (so the caller can log
-    /// what was skipped). An empty result for a non-empty config means every entry was unparsable.
+    /// Returns the parsed addresses. Non-`IP:port` entries are skipped with a warn log.
     pub fn relay_whitelist(&self) -> Vec<SocketAddr> {
         let mut out = Vec::new();
         for raw in &self.server.relay.allow_extend_to {
             match raw.parse::<SocketAddr>() {
                 Ok(a) => out.push(a),
-                Err(e) => {
+                Err(_) => {
+                    // v3.2 may have non-literal entries (CIDRs); skip silently here — the v3.2
+                    // path uses [`Self::relay_allow_rules`] which understands both.
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        out
+    }
+
+    /// v3.2: parse `[server.relay] allow_extend_to` into a list of structured allow-rules that
+    /// may be literal `IP:port`, bare CIDR (any port), or CIDR with an explicit port. The
+    /// returned vector is meant to be fed straight to [`RelayAllowRule::matches`].
+    ///
+    /// Format:
+    ///
+    /// * `"203.0.113.10:443"` — exact `SocketAddr`.
+    /// * `"10.0.0.0/24"` — any port at any IP in the IPv4 subnet.
+    /// * `"10.0.0.0/24:443"` — port 443 at any IP in the IPv4 subnet.
+    /// * `"[2001:db8::/32]:443"` — port 443 at any IP in the IPv6 subnet (square-bracket form).
+    /// * `"2001:db8::/32"` — any port at any IP in the IPv6 subnet (no port).
+    ///
+    /// Unparseable entries are logged at WARN and skipped. An empty result for a non-empty config
+    /// means every entry was rejected; the caller decides whether to refuse all extends or to
+    /// treat that as an open relay.
+    pub fn relay_allow_rules(&self) -> Vec<RelayAllowRule> {
+        let mut out = Vec::new();
+        for raw in &self.server.relay.allow_extend_to {
+            match RelayAllowRule::parse(raw) {
+                Some(r) => out.push(r),
+                None => {
                     tracing::warn!(
                         entry = %raw,
-                        error = %e,
-                        "[server.relay] allow_extend_to: skipping entry — only literal IP:port is \
-                         supported in v3.1 (DNS resolution is out of scope)"
+                        "[server.relay] allow_extend_to: skipping unparseable entry \
+                         (expected IP:port, CIDR, or CIDR:port)"
                     );
                 }
             }
@@ -884,6 +1034,92 @@ impl ServerConfigFile {
     }
 }
 
+/// A single entry in `[server.relay] allow_extend_to`, normalised to one of three shapes:
+///
+/// * [`RelayAllowRule::Exact`] — literal `IP:port`, matches only that exact `SocketAddr`.
+/// * [`RelayAllowRule::Cidr`] — bare CIDR, matches any port at any IP in the subnet.
+/// * [`RelayAllowRule::CidrPort`] — CIDR with explicit port, matches only that port at any IP in
+///   the subnet.
+///
+/// `matches(addr)` returns `true` when the given destination satisfies the rule.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum RelayAllowRule {
+    /// Exact `SocketAddr` match — the v3.1 literal-IP:port form.
+    Exact(SocketAddr),
+    /// CIDR with no port restriction.
+    Cidr(IpNetwork),
+    /// CIDR with a specific port.
+    CidrPort(IpNetwork, u16),
+}
+
+impl RelayAllowRule {
+    /// Parse one `allow_extend_to` entry. Returns `None` on any format error (the caller is
+    /// expected to log at WARN).
+    pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        let s = s.trim();
+        if s.is_empty() {
+            return None;
+        }
+        // Detect the IPv6-with-explicit-port form first: `[...]:port`.
+        if let Some(stripped) = s.strip_prefix('[') {
+            // Find the closing bracket. Whatever follows must be `:port` (or empty for bare).
+            if let Some(end) = stripped.find(']') {
+                let inside = &stripped[..end];
+                let after = &stripped[end + 1..];
+                // `inside` is either a bare IPv6 (no slash) or an IPv6 CIDR.
+                let net = if inside.contains('/') {
+                    inside.parse::<IpNetwork>().ok()?
+                } else {
+                    // bare IPv6: treat as a /128 CIDR for uniformity.
+                    let ip: std::net::Ipv6Addr = inside.parse().ok()?;
+                    IpNetwork::V6(ipnetwork::Ipv6Network::new(ip, 128).ok()?)
+                };
+                if after.is_empty() {
+                    return Some(Self::Cidr(net));
+                }
+                let port = after.strip_prefix(':')?.parse::<u16>().ok()?;
+                return Some(Self::CidrPort(net, port));
+            }
+            return None;
+        }
+        // Not IPv6-bracketed: try as a literal SocketAddr first (v4 `1.2.3.4:443`, or v6 in plain
+        // form — though the latter wouldn't fit here without brackets, leave it to SocketAddr).
+        if let Ok(a) = s.parse::<SocketAddr>() {
+            return Some(Self::Exact(a));
+        }
+        // Try CIDR (with optional port suffix). Split on `:` *after* the slash so we do not eat
+        // an IPv6 inside a bracket — we already handled that branch above.
+        if let Some(slash) = s.find('/') {
+            // Everything before slash is the IP; everything after slash is `prefix[:port]`.
+            let ip_part = &s[..slash];
+            let after = &s[slash + 1..];
+            // If `after` contains a colon, port is the trailing piece.
+            if let Some(colon) = after.find(':') {
+                let prefix_str = &after[..colon];
+                let port_str = &after[colon + 1..];
+                let prefix: u8 = prefix_str.parse().ok()?;
+                let port: u16 = port_str.parse().ok()?;
+                let ip: IpAddr = ip_part.parse().ok()?;
+                let net = IpNetwork::new(ip, prefix).ok()?;
+                return Some(Self::CidrPort(net, port));
+            } else {
+                let net: IpNetwork = s.parse().ok()?;
+                return Some(Self::Cidr(net));
+            }
+        }
+        None
+    }
+
+    /// Does this rule allow `addr`?
+    pub fn matches(&self, addr: SocketAddr) -> bool {
+        match self {
+            Self::Exact(a) => *a == addr,
+            Self::Cidr(net) => net.contains(addr.ip()),
+            Self::CidrPort(net, p) => *p == addr.port() && net.contains(addr.ip()),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 impl ClientConfigFile {
     /// Parse a `client.toml` document from a string.
     pub fn parse(text: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Self> {
@@ -959,29 +1195,91 @@ impl ClientConfigFile {
         })
     }
 
-    /// Parse `[client.circuit] hops` into a vector of [`SocketAddr`]s. Returns an error if any
-    /// entry fails to parse as `IP:port` or the count is wrong for v3.1 (exactly 2). When
-    /// `[client.circuit]` is disabled this still validates the configured hops so misconfiguration
-    /// is caught early; the caller decides whether to actually use the result.
-    ///
-    /// v3.1 does NOT perform DNS resolution; the operator must supply literal IPs.
+    /// Parse `[client.circuit] hops` into a vector of [`SocketAddr`]s. Both the v3.1 flat string
+    /// form and the v3.2 per-hop table form are accepted (the addresses are extracted from
+    /// either). Returns an error if any address fails to parse or the count is wrong for v3.2
+    /// (must be 2 or 3 when enabled).
     pub fn circuit_hops(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<SocketAddr>> {
-        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(self.circuit.hops.len());
-        for raw in &self.circuit.hops {
+        let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(self.client.circuit.hops.len());
+        for hop in &self.client.circuit.hops {
+            let raw = hop.addr();
             let addr: SocketAddr = raw.parse().with_context(|| {
-                format!("invalid [client.circuit] hop '{raw}' (expected IP:port)")
+                format!("invalid [client.circuit] hop addr '{raw}' (expected IP:port)")
             })?;
             out.push(addr);
         }
-        if self.circuit.enabled && out.len() != 2 {
+        if self.client.circuit.enabled && !(2..=3).contains(&out.len()) {
             return Err(anyhow!(
-                "[client.circuit] requires exactly 2 hops (entry, exit) in v3.1; got {}",
+                "[client.circuit] requires 2 or 3 hops in v3.2; got {}",
                 out.len()
             ));
         }
         Ok(out)
     }
 
+    /// v3.2: build the per-hop dial configs for [`crate::circuit::dial_circuit`].
+    ///
+    /// For each `CircuitHop` entry:
+    ///
+    /// * [`CircuitHop::Addr`] (flat string): uses the global `[pki]` cert/key and the global
+    ///   `[client] sni` as the expected server SAN (v3.1 back compat).
+    /// * [`CircuitHop::Full`] (table): loads the per-hop cert/key PEMs and applies the optional
+    ///   `server_name` override (defaulting to `[client] sni`).
+    pub fn build_circuit_hop_configs(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<crate::circuit::HopConfig>> {
+        let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(self.client.circuit.hops.len());
+        // Cache the global PKI cert/key once — every flat entry needs them.
+        let global_ca = read_pem(&self.pki.ca_cert)?;
+        let global_cert = read_pem(&self.pki.cert)?;
+        let global_key = read_pem(&self.pki.key)?;
+        for hop in &self.client.circuit.hops {
+            match hop {
+                CircuitHop::Addr(s) => {
+                    let addr: SocketAddr = s.parse().with_context(|| {
+                        format!("invalid [client.circuit] hop addr '{s}' (expected IP:port)")
+                    })?;
+                    let proto_cfg = aura_proto::ClientConfig {
+                        ca_cert_pem: global_ca.clone(),
+                        client_cert_pem: global_cert.clone(),
+                        client_key_pem: global_key.clone(),
+                        server_name: self.client.sni.clone(),
+                    };
+                    hops.push(crate::circuit::HopConfig { addr, proto_cfg });
+                }
+                CircuitHop::Full {
+                    addr,
+                    cert_path,
+                    key_path,
+                    server_name,
+                } => {
+                    let parsed_addr: SocketAddr = addr.parse().with_context(|| {
+                        format!("invalid [client.circuit] hop addr '{addr}' (expected IP:port)")
+                    })?;
+                    let cert_pem = read_pem(&cert_path.to_string_lossy())?;
+                    let key_pem = read_pem(&key_path.to_string_lossy())?;
+                    let proto_cfg = aura_proto::ClientConfig {
+                        ca_cert_pem: global_ca.clone(),
+                        client_cert_pem: cert_pem,
+                        client_key_pem: key_pem,
+                        server_name: server_name
+                            .clone()
+                            .unwrap_or_else(|| self.client.sni.clone()),
+                    };
+                    hops.push(crate::circuit::HopConfig {
+                        addr: parsed_addr,
+                        proto_cfg,
+                    });
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if self.client.circuit.enabled && !(2..=3).contains(&hops.len()) {
+            return Err(anyhow!(
+                "[client.circuit] requires 2 or 3 hops in v3.2; got {}",
+                hops.len()
+            ));
+        }
+        Ok(hops)
+    }
+
     /// Build a [`RouteTable`] from `[tunnel.split]`.
     ///
     /// CIDR rules are applied directly. Domain rules are recorded via [`RouteTable::add_domain`]
@@ -1626,4 +1924,253 @@ order = ["udp", "smoke-signals"]
         let cfg = ClientConfigFile::parse(bad).expect("parse");
         assert!(cfg.dial_config().is_err());
     }
+
+    // -------- v3.2: [[client.circuit.hops]] / CIDR whitelist / cell_padding ---------------------
+
+    /// v3.1 back-compat: the flat `hops = ["a:port", "b:port"]` form still parses, with the v3.2
+    /// `CircuitSection::hops` now typed as `Vec<CircuitHop>` via the `untagged` enum. The TOML
+    /// table is `[client.circuit]` because `CircuitSection` lives inside `ClientSection`.
+    #[test]
+    fn circuit_v3_1_flat_hops_back_compat() {
+        let c = r#"
+[client]
+name = "x"
+server_addr = "1.2.3.4:443"
+sni = "vpn.example.com"
+[client.circuit]
+enabled = true
+hops = ["198.51.100.5:443", "203.0.113.10:443"]
+[pki]
+ca_cert = "a"
+cert = "b"
+key = "c"
+[tunnel]
+local_ip = "10.7.0.2"
+"#;
+        let cfg = ClientConfigFile::parse(c).expect("parse v3.1 flat hops");
+        assert!(cfg.client.circuit.enabled);
+        assert_eq!(cfg.client.circuit.hops.len(), 2);
+        match &cfg.client.circuit.hops[0] {
+            CircuitHop::Addr(s) => assert_eq!(s, "198.51.100.5:443"),
+            _ => panic!("expected flat Addr variant"),
+        }
+        let addrs = cfg.circuit_hops().expect("addrs");
+        assert_eq!(addrs.len(), 2);
+        assert_eq!(addrs[0].to_string(), "198.51.100.5:443");
+        // cell_padding defaults to false (v3.1 behaviour).
+        assert!(!cfg.client.circuit.cell_padding);
+        assert_eq!(cfg.client.circuit.cell_size, 1280);
+    }
+
+    /// v3.2 per-hop format: `[[client.circuit.hops]]` tables parse and `build_circuit_hop_configs`
+    /// honours per-hop cert/key paths (the read fails here because the paths point at synthetic
+    /// names; we only check addr-level parsing in this test).
+    #[test]
+    fn circuit_v3_2_per_hop_table_parses() {
+        let c = r#"
+[client]
+name = "x"
+server_addr = "1.2.3.4:443"
+sni = "vpn.example.com"
+
+[client.circuit]
+enabled = true
+
+[[client.circuit.hops]]
+addr = "198.51.100.5:443"
+cert_path = "/path/entry.crt"
+key_path = "/path/entry.key"
+
+[[client.circuit.hops]]
+addr = "203.0.113.10:443"
+cert_path = "/path/exit.crt"
+key_path = "/path/exit.key"
+server_name = "alt-exit.example.com"
+
+[pki]
+ca_cert = "a"
+cert = "b"
+key = "c"
+[tunnel]
+local_ip = "10.7.0.2"
+"#;
+        let cfg = ClientConfigFile::parse(c).expect("parse v3.2 per-hop hops");
+        assert!(cfg.client.circuit.enabled);
+        assert_eq!(cfg.client.circuit.hops.len(), 2);
+        match &cfg.client.circuit.hops[1] {
+            CircuitHop::Full {
+                addr,
+                cert_path,
+                key_path,
+                server_name,
+            } => {
+                assert_eq!(addr, "203.0.113.10:443");
+                assert_eq!(cert_path.to_string_lossy(), "/path/exit.crt");
+                assert_eq!(key_path.to_string_lossy(), "/path/exit.key");
+                assert_eq!(server_name.as_deref(), Some("alt-exit.example.com"));
+            }
+            _ => panic!("expected Full variant for hop[1]"),
+        }
+        let addrs = cfg.circuit_hops().expect("addrs");
+        assert_eq!(addrs.len(), 2);
+        assert_eq!(addrs[1].to_string(), "203.0.113.10:443");
+    }
+
+    /// v3.2 allows 3 hops (entry, middle, exit) — both for the addr-only validator and as part of
+    /// the new per-hop tables.
+    #[test]
+    fn circuit_v3_2_three_hops_parses() {
+        let c = r#"
+[client]
+name = "x"
+server_addr = "1.2.3.4:443"
+sni = "vpn.example.com"
+[client.circuit]
+enabled = true
+hops = ["198.51.100.5:443", "198.51.100.99:443", "203.0.113.10:443"]
+[pki]
+ca_cert = "a"
+cert = "b"
+key = "c"
+[tunnel]
+local_ip = "10.7.0.2"
+"#;
+        let cfg = ClientConfigFile::parse(c).expect("parse");
+        let addrs = cfg.circuit_hops().expect("addrs");
+        assert_eq!(addrs.len(), 3);
+        assert_eq!(addrs[2].to_string(), "203.0.113.10:443");
+    }
+
+    /// `[client.circuit] cell_padding = true` parses and the `cell_size` default kicks in.
+    #[test]
+    fn circuit_cell_padding_flag_parses() {
+        let c = r#"
+[client]
+name = "x"
+server_addr = "1.2.3.4:443"
+sni = "vpn.example.com"
+[client.circuit]
+enabled = true
+hops = ["198.51.100.5:443", "203.0.113.10:443"]
+cell_padding = true
+[pki]
+ca_cert = "a"
+cert = "b"
+key = "c"
+[tunnel]
+local_ip = "10.7.0.2"
+"#;
+        let cfg = ClientConfigFile::parse(c).expect("parse");
+        assert!(cfg.client.circuit.cell_padding);
+        assert_eq!(cfg.client.circuit.cell_size, 1280);
+    }
+
+    /// `[server.relay]` allow_extend_to with an exact `IP:port` matches only that exact address.
+    #[test]
+    fn cidr_whitelist_exact_ip() {
+        let rule = RelayAllowRule::parse("203.0.113.10:443").expect("parse exact");
+        assert!(rule.matches("203.0.113.10:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(!rule.matches("203.0.113.10:444".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(!rule.matches("203.0.113.11:443".parse().unwrap()));
+    }
+
+    /// CIDR with no port matches any port at any IP in the subnet (v3.2).
+    #[test]
+    fn cidr_whitelist_subnet() {
+        let rule = RelayAllowRule::parse("10.0.0.0/24").expect("parse cidr");
+        assert!(rule.matches("10.0.0.5:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(rule.matches("10.0.0.250:8080".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(
+            !rule.matches("10.0.1.5:443".parse().unwrap()),
+            "outside /24"
+        );
+        assert!(!rule.matches("11.0.0.5:443".parse().unwrap()));
+    }
+
+    /// CIDR with explicit port matches only that port within the subnet.
+    #[test]
+    fn cidr_whitelist_subnet_with_port() {
+        let rule = RelayAllowRule::parse("10.0.0.0/24:443").expect("parse cidr+port");
+        assert!(rule.matches("10.0.0.5:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(
+            !rule.matches("10.0.0.5:8080".parse().unwrap()),
+            "wrong port"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !rule.matches("11.0.0.5:443".parse().unwrap()),
+            "outside subnet"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// IPv6 CIDR forms: bare `2001:db8::/32` (no port) and `[2001:db8::/32]:443` (with port).
+    #[test]
+    fn cidr_whitelist_v6() {
+        let bare = RelayAllowRule::parse("2001:db8::/32").expect("parse v6 cidr");
+        assert!(bare.matches("[2001:db8::1]:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(bare.matches("[2001:db8:abcd::5]:9999".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(
+            !bare.matches("[2001:db9::1]:443".parse().unwrap()),
+            "outside /32"
+        );
+
+        let with_port = RelayAllowRule::parse("[2001:db8::/32]:443").expect("parse v6 cidr+port");
+        assert!(with_port.matches("[2001:db8::1]:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(
+            !with_port.matches("[2001:db8::1]:8080".parse().unwrap()),
+            "wrong port on v6 cidr+port rule"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// `relay_allow_rules` parses a heterogeneous list (literal + CIDR + CIDR:port) and skips bad
+    /// entries with a warn log (still returning the valid ones).
+    #[test]
+    fn relay_allow_rules_heterogeneous_list() {
+        let s = r#"
+[server]
+name = "edge"
+[server.relay]
+enabled = true
+allow_extend_to = [
+    "203.0.113.10:443",
+    "10.0.0.0/24",
+    "10.1.0.0/24:443",
+    "garbage-not-an-ip",
+]
+[pki]
+ca_cert = "a"
+cert = "b"
+key = "c"
+[tunnel]
+pool_cidr = "10.7.0.0/24"
+"#;
+        let cfg = ServerConfigFile::parse(s).expect("parse");
+        let rules = cfg.relay_allow_rules();
+        assert_eq!(rules.len(), 3, "3 valid rules; 1 garbage entry skipped");
+        assert!(rules[0].matches("203.0.113.10:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(rules[1].matches("10.0.0.5:9999".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(rules[2].matches("10.1.0.5:443".parse().unwrap()));
+        assert!(!rules[2].matches("10.1.0.5:444".parse().unwrap()));
+    }
+
+    /// `[server.relay] cell_padding` parses and the default `cell_size` kicks in (1280).
+    #[test]
+    fn relay_cell_padding_parses() {
+        let s = r#"
+[server]
+name = "edge"
+[server.relay]
+enabled = true
+allow_extend_to = ["203.0.113.10:443"]
+cell_padding = true
+[pki]
+ca_cert = "a"
+cert = "b"
+key = "c"
+[tunnel]
+pool_cidr = "10.7.0.0/24"
+"#;
+        let cfg = ServerConfigFile::parse(s).expect("parse");
+        assert!(cfg.server.relay.cell_padding);
+        assert_eq!(cfg.server.relay.cell_size, 1280);
+    }
 }

crates/aura-cli/src/init.rs

@@ -290,6 +290,15 @@ pub struct ProvisionClientOpts {
     pub enable_cover_traffic: bool,
     /// Optional bridge addresses (`bridges = [...]`).
     pub bridges: Vec<String>,
+    /// v3.2: when set to `Some(N)` with `N >= 2`, generate **N independent client certificates**
+    /// (one UUID-v4 CN per cert) named `circuit-hop-0.crt` / `.key`, `circuit-hop-1.crt` / `.key`,
+    /// ..., `circuit-hop-{N-1}.crt` / `.key` inside the bundle. Each cert is rendered as a
+    /// `[[client.circuit.hops]]` table in the bundled `client.toml`, with `cert_path` / `key_path`
+    /// pointing at the freshly-issued file. This is what makes the v3.2 entry-relay and the exit
+    /// see *different* certificate CNs and therefore unable to link the two handshakes by
+    /// identity. The hop addresses are NOT filled in here — the operator must edit them into
+    /// the rendered `client.toml` before use.
+    pub circuit_hops: Option<usize>,
     /// When `true`, overwrite existing files in `out_dir`. Default `false` errors.
     pub force: bool,
 }
@@ -318,6 +327,7 @@ impl ProvisionClientOpts {
             enable_knock: false,
             enable_cover_traffic: false,
             bridges: Vec::new(),
+            circuit_hops: None,
             force: false,
         }
     }
@@ -338,6 +348,10 @@ pub struct ProvisionClientReport {
     pub client_key: PathBuf,
     /// Rendered client.toml.
     pub client_config: PathBuf,
+    /// v3.2: per-hop circuit cert/key pairs (one per hop in `circuit_hops`). Empty when
+    /// `opts.circuit_hops` is `None`. Each tuple is `(cn, cert_path, key_path)`; `cn` is a
+    /// freshly-generated UUID v4 distinct from the main `id` above.
+    pub circuit_hop_certs: Vec<(String, PathBuf, PathBuf)>,
 }
 
 /// Run the provision-client workflow. Pure: returns a [`ProvisionClientReport`] without printing.
@@ -373,9 +387,40 @@ pub fn provision_client(opts: &ProvisionClientOpts) -> anyhow::Result<ProvisionC
     std::fs::copy(&ca_src, &bundled_ca)
         .with_context(|| format!("copying {} -> {}", ca_src.display(), bundled_ca.display()))?;
 
+    // 3.5 (v3.2): when --circuit-hops N is set, issue N independent client certs (UUID-v4 CN
+    // each) named circuit-hop-{i}.crt / .key. Each cert gets its own random CN so the entry-relay
+    // and the exit cannot link the two handshakes by identity. We use a per-hop stem rather than
+    // a separate subdirectory so a flat bundle directory stays readable.
+    let mut circuit_hop_certs: Vec<(String, PathBuf, PathBuf)> = Vec::new();
+    if let Some(n) = opts.circuit_hops {
+        if n < 2 {
+            return Err(anyhow!(
+                "--circuit-hops requires N >= 2 (got {n}); v3.2 supports 2 or 3 hops"
+            ));
+        }
+        for i in 0..n {
+            // Generate a fresh UUID v4 per hop (NOT the main `id`).
+            let cn = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
+            let stem = format!("circuit-hop-{i}");
+            let (cert, key) = pki::issue_client(&cn, &opts.out_dir, &opts.ca_dir)
+                .with_context(|| format!("issuing v3.2 circuit hop-{i} client cert (cn = {cn})"))?;
+            // Rename client.crt / client.key from `issue_client` (which writes to a fixed stem)
+            // into our per-hop names. issue_client uses write_leaf with stem "client", so it
+            // emits client.crt / client.key — rename to circuit-hop-{i}.crt / .key.
+            let new_cert = opts.out_dir.join(format!("{stem}.crt"));
+            let new_key = opts.out_dir.join(format!("{stem}.key"));
+            std::fs::rename(&cert, &new_cert).with_context(|| {
+                format!("renaming {} -> {}", cert.display(), new_cert.display())
+            })?;
+            std::fs::rename(&key, &new_key)
+                .with_context(|| format!("renaming {} -> {}", key.display(), new_key.display()))?;
+            circuit_hop_certs.push((cn, new_cert, new_key));
+        }
+    }
+
     // 4: render client.toml. Use file names (not absolute paths) so the bundle is portable —
     // the client can drop the whole directory anywhere and `cd` in to run `aura client`.
-    let toml_text = render_client_toml(opts, &id);
+    let toml_text = render_client_toml(opts, &id, &circuit_hop_certs);
     let client_config = opts.out_dir.join("client.toml");
     std::fs::write(&client_config, toml_text)
         .with_context(|| format!("writing {}", client_config.display()))?;
@@ -387,12 +432,22 @@ pub fn provision_client(opts: &ProvisionClientOpts) -> anyhow::Result<ProvisionC
         client_cert,
         client_key,
         client_config,
+        circuit_hop_certs,
     })
 }
 
 /// Render the `client.toml` document for `opts` + the assigned `id`. Public for tests that want
 /// to parse-roundtrip the output without going through the full filesystem dance.
-pub fn render_client_toml(opts: &ProvisionClientOpts, id: &str) -> String {
+///
+/// When `circuit_hop_certs` is non-empty, append a `[client.circuit]` block followed by one
+/// `[[client.circuit.hops]]` table per hop. The hop **addresses are placeholders** (`<EDIT-ME>`)
+/// because `provision-client` does not know the relay topology — the operator MUST fill in real
+/// `IP:port` strings before running `aura client`.
+pub fn render_client_toml(
+    opts: &ProvisionClientOpts,
+    id: &str,
+    circuit_hop_certs: &[(String, std::path::PathBuf, std::path::PathBuf)],
+) -> String {
     let mut s = String::new();
     s.push_str(
         "# Generated by `aura provision-client`. Edit by hand if you know what you're doing.\n\n",
@@ -460,5 +515,37 @@ pub fn render_client_toml(opts: &ProvisionClientOpts, id: &str) -> String {
     s.push_str("mean_interval_ms = 500\n");
     s.push_str("jitter = 0.5\n");
 
+    // v3.2: append the [client.circuit] block if --circuit-hops was passed. The hop addresses
+    // are placeholders — the operator fills them in before running `aura client`.
+    if !circuit_hop_certs.is_empty() {
+        s.push('\n');
+        s.push_str("# v3.2 multi-hop: per-hop client certificates were generated by\n");
+        s.push_str("# `aura provision-client --circuit-hops N`. The entry-relay and the exit\n");
+        s.push_str("# (and any middle hop) see DIFFERENT certificate CNs — they cannot link\n");
+        s.push_str(
+            "# the two handshakes by identity. Fill in the `addr` fields below before use.\n",
+        );
+        s.push_str("[client.circuit]\n");
+        s.push_str("enabled = true\n");
+        s.push_str("cell_padding = true\n");
+        s.push_str("cell_size = 1280\n\n");
+        for (i, (cn, cert, key)) in circuit_hop_certs.iter().enumerate() {
+            s.push_str("[[client.circuit.hops]]\n");
+            s.push_str(&format!("# hop {i} — cn = {cn}\n"));
+            s.push_str("addr      = \"<EDIT-ME-HOP-ADDR:PORT>\"\n");
+            let cert_name = cert
+                .file_name()
+                .map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| cert.display().to_string());
+            let key_name = key
+                .file_name()
+                .map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| key.display().to_string());
+            s.push_str(&format!("cert_path = \"{}\"\n", cert_name));
+            s.push_str(&format!("key_path  = \"{}\"\n", key_name));
+            s.push('\n');
+        }
+    }
+
     s
 }

crates/aura-cli/src/lib.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 pub mod admin;
 pub mod bench;
+pub mod cells;
 pub mod circuit;
 pub mod client;
 pub mod config;

crates/aura-cli/src/main.rs

@@ -237,6 +237,13 @@ struct ProvisionClientArgs {
     /// Comma-separated list of fallback server addresses (IP or IP:port).
     #[arg(long)]
     bridges: Option<String>,
+    /// v3.2: generate N independent client certificates (one UUID-v4 CN each) for an N-hop
+    /// circuit. Each cert gets its own random CN so the entry-relay, any middle hop, and the
+    /// exit cannot link the two handshakes by identity. N must be 2 or 3. When set, the bundled
+    /// `client.toml` gains a `[client.circuit]` block with N `[[client.circuit.hops]]` tables
+    /// (the operator must fill in real hop addresses).
+    #[arg(long)]
+    circuit_hops: Option<usize>,
     /// Overwrite an existing bundle directory.
     #[arg(long)]
     force: bool,
@@ -532,6 +539,7 @@ fn run_provision_client(args: ProvisionClientArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         enable_knock: args.enable_knock,
         enable_cover_traffic: args.enable_cover_traffic,
         bridges,
+        circuit_hops: args.circuit_hops,
         force: args.force,
     };
     let report = init::provision_client(&opts)?;
@@ -542,6 +550,22 @@ fn run_provision_client(args: ProvisionClientArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     println!("  client.crt:  {}", report.client_cert.display());
     println!("  client.key:  {}", report.client_key.display());
     println!("  client.toml: {}", report.client_config.display());
+    if !report.circuit_hop_certs.is_empty() {
+        println!(
+            "  v3.2 per-hop circuit certs ({}):",
+            report.circuit_hop_certs.len()
+        );
+        for (i, (cn, cert, key)) in report.circuit_hop_certs.iter().enumerate() {
+            println!(
+                "    hop {i}: cn = {cn}\n             cert: {}\n             key:  {}",
+                cert.display(),
+                key.display()
+            );
+        }
+        println!(
+            "  EDIT the rendered client.toml and fill in the `addr` of each [[client.circuit.hops]] entry."
+        );
+    }
     println!();
     println!("Hand the entire bundle directory to the client via any secure channel.");
     println!(

crates/aura-cli/src/relay.rs

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ use aura_proto::{
 };
 use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
 
+use crate::config::RelayAllowRule;
+
 /// How long the relay waits for the client's first packet on a fresh connection before falling
 /// back to treating the connection as a normal VPN client. Two seconds is comfortably longer than
 /// a loopback round-trip (the client sends `ExtendBridge` immediately after the outer handshake
@@ -63,7 +65,9 @@ pub enum RendezvousOutcome {
     Refused,
 }
 
-/// Perform the rendezvous on a freshly-accepted relay connection.
+/// Perform the rendezvous on a freshly-accepted relay connection (v3.1 back-compat API:
+/// whitelist is a flat `&[SocketAddr]`). For v3.2's CIDR-aware allow rules, use
+/// [`rendezvous_with_rules`] — it accepts the [`RelayAllowRule`] enum.
 ///
 /// Reads (with a [`EXTEND_RENDEZVOUS_SECS`] timeout) the next packet from `conn`. When it decodes
 /// as [`ControlKind::ExtendBridge`] and the requested exit is whitelisted, this function:
@@ -79,6 +83,22 @@ pub enum RendezvousOutcome {
 pub async fn rendezvous(
     conn: &Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
     whitelist: &[SocketAddr],
+) -> RendezvousOutcome {
+    // Adapter: lift the flat whitelist into v3.2 `RelayAllowRule::Exact` entries and delegate.
+    let rules: Vec<RelayAllowRule> = whitelist
+        .iter()
+        .copied()
+        .map(RelayAllowRule::Exact)
+        .collect();
+    rendezvous_with_rules(conn, &rules).await
+}
+
+/// v3.2: rendezvous variant that takes a list of [`RelayAllowRule`] (literal `IP:port` /
+/// bare CIDR / CIDR with explicit port). Semantics are identical to [`rendezvous`] otherwise —
+/// see its docstring.
+pub async fn rendezvous_with_rules(
+    conn: &Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
+    rules: &[RelayAllowRule],
 ) -> RendezvousOutcome {
     let pkt = match tokio::time::timeout(
         Duration::from_secs(EXTEND_RENDEZVOUS_SECS),
@@ -140,15 +160,15 @@ pub async fn rendezvous(
         }
     };
 
-    // Whitelist enforcement. Empty whitelist == open relay (operator was warned via the log line
+    // Whitelist enforcement. Empty rule list == open relay (operator was warned via the log line
     // emitted when the section was loaded; we also re-log here so each accepted bridge leaves a
     // breadcrumb).
-    if whitelist.is_empty() {
+    if rules.is_empty() {
         tracing::warn!(
             exit = %exit_addr,
             "relay running as OPEN relay (allow_extend_to is empty); accepting bridge"
         );
-    } else if !whitelist.contains(&exit_addr) {
+    } else if !rules.iter().any(|r| r.matches(exit_addr)) {
         tracing::warn!(
             exit = %exit_addr,
             "relay rejecting bridge: exit not in allow_extend_to"

crates/aura-cli/src/server.rs

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Duration;
 
 use anyhow::Context;
+use aura_proto::PacketConnection;
 use aura_transport::{MultiServer, TransportMode};
 use aura_tunnel::{AuraTun, RouteAction, RouteTable};
 use ipnetwork::IpNetwork;
@@ -275,25 +276,29 @@ pub async fn run(config_path: &Path, admin_socket: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         }
     });
 
-    // v3.1: when [server.relay] is enabled, parse the whitelist once and log a warning if it is
-    // empty (open relay). The whitelist is a `Vec<SocketAddr>`; an empty list means "all
-    // addresses allowed" (dangerous; see the section's docs).
+    // v3.1 / v3.2: when [server.relay] is enabled, parse the allow-rules once. The rules accept
+    // literal `IP:port`, bare CIDR (any port), or CIDR with explicit port. An empty list means
+    // "all addresses allowed" (dangerous; the runtime logs a warning).
     let relay_enabled = cfg.server.relay.enabled;
-    let relay_whitelist: Vec<std::net::SocketAddr> = if relay_enabled {
-        let wl = cfg.relay_whitelist();
-        if wl.is_empty() {
+    let relay_cell_padding = cfg.server.relay.cell_padding;
+    let relay_cell_size = cfg.server.relay.cell_size;
+    let relay_allow_rules: Vec<crate::config::RelayAllowRule> = if relay_enabled {
+        let rules = cfg.relay_allow_rules();
+        if rules.is_empty() {
             tracing::warn!(
                 "[server.relay] is enabled with an EMPTY allow_extend_to — running as OPEN relay; \
                  every ExtendBridge request will be accepted. Set allow_extend_to to a curated list."
             );
         } else {
             tracing::info!(
-                count = wl.len(),
-                "[server.relay] enabled with {} whitelisted exit address(es)",
-                wl.len()
+                count = rules.len(),
+                cell_padding = relay_cell_padding,
+                cell_size = relay_cell_size,
+                "[server.relay] enabled with {} allow-rule(s)",
+                rules.len()
             );
         }
-        wl
+        rules
     } else {
         Vec::new()
     };
@@ -324,15 +329,18 @@ pub async fn run(config_path: &Path, admin_socket: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         let mode = accepted.mode;
         let conn = accepted.conn;
 
-        // v3.1 relay rendezvous (only on UDP-mode connections; v3.1 does not bridge TCP / QUIC).
+        // v3.1 / v3.2 relay rendezvous (only on UDP-mode connections; relay does not bridge
+        // TCP / QUIC in v3.x). The relay never decodes cell padding — the bytes it forwards are
+        // the **inner** AEAD-encrypted ciphertext from the client to the exit; cell structure
+        // lives one layer below (only the exit and the client see cells).
         if relay_enabled && mode == TransportMode::Udp {
-            match relay::rendezvous(&conn, &relay_whitelist).await {
+            match relay::rendezvous_with_rules(&conn, &relay_allow_rules).await {
                 RendezvousOutcome::Bridged { bridge } => {
                     // Spawn the two forwarder tasks and skip everything else (no IP pool entry,
                     // no router registration, no CRL push — bridged peers are opaque).
                     tracing::info!(
                         peer = ?peer_id, %mode,
-                        "v3.1 relay: bridging connection to exit"
+                        "v3.x relay: bridging connection to exit"
                     );
                     let client_conn = Arc::clone(&conn);
                     tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -361,6 +369,21 @@ pub async fn run(config_path: &Path, admin_socket: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
             }
         }
 
+        // v3.2: when this server runs as an EXIT for cell-padded circuit clients, wrap the
+        // accepted inner-session conn in CellPaddingConn. Every send/recv on this conn (CRL push,
+        // router register, inbound forwarder) now goes through the cell wrapper so its bytes are
+        // padded cells end-to-end. Wrapped here (not earlier) so the relay rendezvous, which
+        // reads control envelopes naked on the outer connection, is not affected.
+        let conn: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> =
+            if cfg.server.cell_padding_for_circuit_clients && mode == TransportMode::Udp {
+                Arc::new(crate::cells::CellPaddingConn::new(
+                    conn,
+                    cfg.server.relay.cell_size,
+                ))
+            } else {
+                conn
+            };
+
         // Pick the client id used for static-pool lookup. The certificate CN is the only
         // identity we can trust here; if absent (defensive — every authenticated connection has
         // one in practice) fall back to a unique-per-instance marker so dynamic allocation still

crates/aura-cli/tests/cli_provision_client.rs

@@ -178,6 +178,108 @@ fn provision_client_anti_surveillance_toggles() {
     let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root);
 }
 
+/// v3.2: `--circuit-hops N` issues N independent client certs, each with its own UUID v4 CN.
+/// The bundled `client.toml` gains a `[client.circuit]` section with N `[[client.circuit.hops]]`
+/// tables. Each hop's `cert_path` / `key_path` references the freshly-issued PEM file in the
+/// bundle, and each cert's CN is a distinct UUID v4.
+#[test]
+fn provision_client_with_v3_2_circuit_hops() {
+    let root = temp_dir("v32hops");
+    let ca_dir = root.join("ca");
+    bootstrap_ca(&ca_dir);
+    let bundle = root.join("bundle");
+
+    let mut opts = ProvisionClientOpts::new(
+        &ca_dir,
+        "203.0.113.10",
+        "vpn.example.com",
+        "10.7.0.7",
+        &bundle,
+    );
+    opts.circuit_hops = Some(3); // entry + middle + exit
+    let report = init::provision_client(&opts).expect("provision");
+
+    // Three distinct per-hop certs were issued, all with unique UUID-v4 CNs.
+    assert_eq!(report.circuit_hop_certs.len(), 3, "3 hop certs issued");
+    let mut cns: Vec<String> = report
+        .circuit_hop_certs
+        .iter()
+        .map(|(cn, _, _)| cn.clone())
+        .collect();
+    cns.sort();
+    cns.dedup();
+    assert_eq!(cns.len(), 3, "all hop CNs are distinct");
+    for (cn, _, _) in &report.circuit_hop_certs {
+        let parsed = uuid::Uuid::parse_str(cn).expect("hop cn is a uuid");
+        assert_eq!(parsed.get_version_num(), 4, "hop cn is uuid v4");
+    }
+    for (i, (_, cert, key)) in report.circuit_hop_certs.iter().enumerate() {
+        assert!(cert.exists(), "hop {i} cert exists");
+        assert!(key.exists(), "hop {i} key exists");
+        assert!(cert
+            .file_name()
+            .unwrap()
+            .to_string_lossy()
+            .contains(&format!("circuit-hop-{i}")));
+    }
+
+    // The bundled client.toml has `[client.circuit] enabled = true` and 3 hop tables.
+    let cfg = ClientConfigFile::load(&report.client_config).expect("parse client.toml");
+    assert!(cfg.client.circuit.enabled, "[client.circuit] enabled");
+    assert_eq!(cfg.client.circuit.hops.len(), 3, "3 hops in client.toml");
+    // Every hop entry is the Full variant (per-hop cert/key paths).
+    use aura_cli::config::CircuitHop;
+    for (i, hop) in cfg.client.circuit.hops.iter().enumerate() {
+        match hop {
+            CircuitHop::Full {
+                cert_path,
+                key_path,
+                ..
+            } => {
+                let cert_str = cert_path.to_string_lossy();
+                let key_str = key_path.to_string_lossy();
+                assert!(
+                    cert_str.contains(&format!("circuit-hop-{i}")),
+                    "hop {i} cert_path references circuit-hop-{i}.crt; got {cert_str}"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    key_str.contains(&format!("circuit-hop-{i}")),
+                    "hop {i} key_path references circuit-hop-{i}.key; got {key_str}"
+                );
+            }
+            _ => panic!("hop {i}: expected Full variant in rendered client.toml"),
+        }
+    }
+    // Cell padding is enabled by default in the v3.2 rendered config.
+    assert!(
+        cfg.client.circuit.cell_padding,
+        "cell_padding defaults true in v3.2 render"
+    );
+
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root);
+}
+
+/// `--circuit-hops 1` is rejected (N must be >= 2).
+#[test]
+fn provision_client_circuit_hops_too_few_errors() {
+    let root = temp_dir("v32hops_few");
+    let ca_dir = root.join("ca");
+    bootstrap_ca(&ca_dir);
+    let bundle = root.join("bundle");
+
+    let mut opts = ProvisionClientOpts::new(
+        &ca_dir,
+        "203.0.113.10",
+        "vpn.example.com",
+        "10.7.0.8",
+        &bundle,
+    );
+    opts.circuit_hops = Some(1);
+    let err = init::provision_client(&opts).unwrap_err().to_string();
+    assert!(err.contains("circuit-hops"), "got: {err}");
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&root);
+}
+
 /// A non-empty bundle directory triggers an error without `--force`.
 #[test]
 fn provision_client_refuses_non_empty_bundle() {

crates/aura-cli/tests/multihop.rs

@@ -308,3 +308,203 @@ async fn multihop_back_compat_relay_disabled() {
 
     relay_task.abort();
 }
+
+// ---- v3.2: 3-hop + per-hop client certs + cell padding -----------------------------------------
+
+use aura_cli::cells::CellPaddingConn;
+use aura_cli::circuit::HopConfig;
+
+const ENTRY_SAN: &str = "localhost-entry";
+const MIDDLE_SAN: &str = "localhost-middle";
+const CLIENT_ID_ENTRY: &str = "client-entry";
+const CLIENT_ID_MIDDLE: &str = "client-middle";
+const CLIENT_ID_EXIT: &str = "client-exit";
+
+/// Build a [`ClientConfig`] with the given CN and expected server SAN. v3.2: a different cert /
+/// CN per hop is the identity-unlinkable design.
+fn client_cfg_with_cn(ca: &AuraCa, cn: &str, server_name: &str) -> ClientConfig {
+    let issued = ca.issue_client_cert(cn).expect("issue client cert");
+    ClientConfig {
+        ca_cert_pem: ca.ca_cert_pem(),
+        client_cert_pem: issued.cert_pem,
+        client_key_pem: issued.key_pem,
+        server_name: server_name.to_string(),
+    }
+}
+
+/// v3.2 3-hop end-to-end: `client → A (entry-relay) → B (middle-relay) → C (exit)`. Each hop is
+/// a real Aura UdpServer on loopback. The client uses a **different** client cert per hop
+/// (identity-unlinkable). The exit echoes three packets which the client must receive back
+/// through three layers of AEAD encryption.
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+async fn multihop_v3_2_three_hops_end_to_end() {
+    let ca = AuraCa::generate("Aura v3.2 3-hop Test CA").expect("ca");
+
+    let entry_proto = server_cfg(&ca, ENTRY_SAN);
+    let middle_proto = server_cfg(&ca, MIDDLE_SAN);
+    let exit_proto = server_cfg(&ca, EXIT_SAN);
+
+    let entry_port = free_udp_port();
+    let middle_port = free_udp_port();
+    let exit_port = free_udp_port();
+    let entry_addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{entry_port}").parse().unwrap();
+    let middle_addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{middle_port}").parse().unwrap();
+    let exit_addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{exit_port}").parse().unwrap();
+
+    let entry_server =
+        UdpServer::bind(entry_addr, entry_proto, UdpOpts::default()).expect("bind entry");
+    let middle_server =
+        UdpServer::bind(middle_addr, middle_proto, UdpOpts::default()).expect("bind middle");
+    let exit_server =
+        UdpServer::bind(exit_addr, exit_proto, UdpOpts::default()).expect("bind exit");
+    let entry_actual = entry_server.local_addr().expect("entry addr");
+    let middle_actual = middle_server.local_addr().expect("middle addr");
+    let exit_actual = exit_server.local_addr().expect("exit addr");
+
+    // Whitelists per hop (CIDR-aware): entry allows middle; middle allows exit. Both can be exact
+    // entries here; this test exercises the literal-IP:port path.
+    let entry_whitelist = vec![middle_actual];
+    let middle_whitelist = vec![exit_actual];
+
+    let exit_task = tokio::spawn(spawn_exit(exit_server));
+    let middle_task = tokio::spawn(spawn_relay(middle_server, middle_whitelist));
+    let entry_task = tokio::spawn(spawn_relay(entry_server, entry_whitelist));
+
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
+
+    // Per-hop client configs: distinct CN per hop, distinct server_name per hop.
+    let hops = vec![
+        HopConfig {
+            addr: entry_actual,
+            proto_cfg: client_cfg_with_cn(&ca, CLIENT_ID_ENTRY, ENTRY_SAN),
+        },
+        HopConfig {
+            addr: middle_actual,
+            proto_cfg: client_cfg_with_cn(&ca, CLIENT_ID_MIDDLE, MIDDLE_SAN),
+        },
+        HopConfig {
+            addr: exit_actual,
+            proto_cfg: client_cfg_with_cn(&ca, CLIENT_ID_EXIT, EXIT_SAN),
+        },
+    ];
+
+    let circuit_conn = tokio::time::timeout(
+        Duration::from_secs(60),
+        circuit::dial_circuit(&hops, UdpOpts::default()),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("dial_circuit did not finish within 60s")
+    .expect("dial_circuit succeeded");
+
+    // peer_id is the exit's SAN — the innermost handshake authenticated the exit cert through
+    // every relay opaquely.
+    assert_eq!(
+        circuit_conn.peer_id(),
+        Some(EXIT_SAN),
+        "circuit.peer_id() must be the exit's SAN through 3 hops"
+    );
+
+    // Echo three packets — through THREE AEAD layers.
+    let payloads: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![
+        b"hello 3-hop".to_vec(),
+        vec![0x77u8; 600],
+        (0..200u8).collect(),
+    ];
+    for pkt in &payloads {
+        circuit_conn.send_packet(pkt).await.expect("circuit send");
+        let echoed = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), circuit_conn.recv_packet())
+            .await
+            .expect("recv timeout")
+            .expect("recv from exit through 3-hop circuit");
+        assert_eq!(&echoed, pkt, "echoed payload must match");
+    }
+
+    drop(circuit_conn);
+    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), exit_task).await;
+    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), middle_task).await;
+    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), entry_task).await;
+}
+
+/// v3.2: smoke-test the [`CellPaddingConn`] wrap around a 2-hop circuit. The exit also wraps its
+/// `Accepted.conn` in a `CellPaddingConn`; the bytes the client sends are padded cells, ferried
+/// opaquely through the relay, and unwrapped by the exit. We exchange three payloads of varying
+/// (small) sizes through the padded layer.
+#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread")]
+async fn multihop_v3_2_cell_padding_smoke() {
+    let ca = AuraCa::generate("Aura v3.2 cell-padding Test CA").expect("ca");
+    let exit_proto = server_cfg(&ca, EXIT_SAN);
+    let relay_proto = server_cfg(&ca, RELAY_SAN);
+    let client_proto = client_cfg(&ca, EXIT_SAN);
+
+    let exit_port = free_udp_port();
+    let relay_port = free_udp_port();
+    let exit_addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{exit_port}").parse().unwrap();
+    let relay_addr: SocketAddr = format!("127.0.0.1:{relay_port}").parse().unwrap();
+
+    let exit_server =
+        UdpServer::bind(exit_addr, exit_proto, UdpOpts::default()).expect("bind exit");
+    let relay_server =
+        UdpServer::bind(relay_addr, relay_proto, UdpOpts::default()).expect("bind relay");
+    let exit_actual = exit_server.local_addr().expect("exit addr");
+    let relay_actual = relay_server.local_addr().expect("relay addr");
+
+    let whitelist = vec![exit_actual];
+
+    // Exit echoes three CELL-PADDED packets back. The CellPaddingConn wrap on the exit's side
+    // means recv_packet returns the original (unpadded) payload, and send_packet pads it again.
+    let cell_size = 512;
+    let exit_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let conn = exit_server.accept().await.expect("exit accept");
+        drop(exit_server);
+        let conn: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = Arc::new(conn);
+        let wrapped = Arc::new(CellPaddingConn::new(conn, cell_size));
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            match wrapped.recv_packet().await {
+                Ok(pkt) => {
+                    if wrapped.send_packet(&pkt).await.is_err() {
+                        return;
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(_) => return,
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    let relay_task = tokio::spawn(spawn_relay(relay_server, whitelist));
+
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20)).await;
+
+    let circuit_conn = tokio::time::timeout(
+        Duration::from_secs(30),
+        circuit::dial_circuit_with_relay_name(
+            &[relay_actual, exit_actual],
+            client_proto,
+            UdpOpts::default(),
+            Some(RELAY_SAN),
+        ),
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("dial_circuit did not finish within 30s")
+    .expect("dial_circuit succeeded");
+
+    // Wrap the client side in CellPaddingConn so its sends become cells.
+    let padded: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> =
+        Arc::new(CellPaddingConn::new(circuit_conn.into_dyn(), cell_size));
+
+    let payloads: Vec<Vec<u8>> = vec![
+        b"tiny".to_vec(),
+        vec![0xEFu8; 100],
+        b"another payload that fits inside cell".to_vec(),
+    ];
+    for pkt in &payloads {
+        padded.send_packet(pkt).await.expect("padded send");
+        let echoed = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(10), padded.recv_packet())
+            .await
+            .expect("recv timeout")
+            .expect("recv from padded exit");
+        assert_eq!(&echoed, pkt, "padded roundtrip preserves payload");
+    }
+
+    drop(padded);
+    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), exit_task).await;
+    let _ = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), relay_task).await;
+}