5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
xah30 7d711d8938 feat(transport): anti-surveillance - UDP port-knocking + cover traffic
Two opt-in (default off) features directly targeting the kind of operator
dragnet described in the news context — make the server harder to identify
on a scan, and the traffic harder to fingerprint by volume/timing analysis.

1) Port-knocking (probe resistance, UDP)
   - Wire: every HS datagram (0x01) is prefixed with a 16-byte HMAC token
     when UdpOpts.knock_required is on:
       knock = HMAC-SHA256(knock_key, u64_be(unix_minute))[..16]
   - Server-side: validates against {now-1, now, now+1} minutes (3-minute
     window for clock skew, constant-time compare). Invalid -> silent drop;
     the port looks closed to scanners.
   - knock_key comes from the CLI (derived from CA fingerprint at the
     deployment layer); transport just consumes it.
   - DATA datagrams unchanged (AEAD already proves legitimacy past hs).

2) Cover traffic (chaff, UDP)
   - Optional background task per UdpConnection: every random delay
     (mean_interval_ms +/- jitter, default 500ms +/- 50%) sends a
     Frame::Ping{seq=random} when no Data was sent in the recent window
     (idle-skip => zero overhead under load). RAII-aborted on Drop.
   - Receiver answers Ping with Pong (existing logic); both are consumed
     internally by recv_packet, invisible to the app.

API: UdpOpts gains knock_required/knock_key/cover_traffic_enabled/
cover_mean_interval_ms/cover_jitter (all defaults preserve v2 behavior).
Helpers exported: knock_for_minute, KNOCK_LEN.

Local deps: hmac 0.12 + sha2 0.10 (already in workspace lockfile, no new
resolution). Workspace: 185 tests passed (+11), clippy -D warnings clean,
fmt clean. 174 baseline tests unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 11:50:16 +03:00
xah30 821f7711e7 feat(transport): real TLS-443 on the TCP backend (replaces HTTP/1.1 masquerade)
The TCP fallback now does a full outer TLS handshake (tokio-rustls 0.26 over
rustls 0.23, ring provider) before the Aura proto handshake, exactly like the
QUIC backend: on the wire it is indistinguishable from genuine HTTPS until the
inner Aura mutual-auth handshake starts. Removes v1's "light HTTP masquerade"
limitation; the real security boundary remains the inner PQ handshake.

- aura-transport::tcp: dropped the HTTP/1.1 preamble helpers and TcpOpts
  fields (masquerade, host, user_agent, server_header). New flow:
  TlsAcceptor::accept (server) / TlsConnector::connect (client) →
  tokio::io::split(TlsStream) → server_handshake / client_handshake → Session.
  Client reuses crate::quic::AcceptAnyServerCert (outer SNI not authenticated;
  inner handshake is the security boundary). Outer server cert auto-sourced
  from proto_cfg.server_cert_pem (no API change for the CLI's bind).
- ALPN default: ["h2", "http/1.1"] (DEFAULT_TCP_ALPN, exported).
- TcpOpts: now just { alpn: Option<Vec<Vec<u8>>> }.
- TcpClient::connect gains an outer-SNI &str param; DialConfig.sni passes it
  through (separate from the inner proto_cfg.server_name).
- tokio-rustls 0.26 added as a transport-local dependency (not workspace).

CLI updates: removed dead host/user_agent/server_header wiring; mask rotation
no longer touches TCP outer parameters (TLS doesn't have a Host header on
the wire). [transport] masquerade kept as a no-op for back-compat with old
configs (documented).

3 new tcp_loopback tests (default ALPN end-to-end, custom ALPN, outer SNI
mismatch still connects = proves accept-any is in effect). Workspace: 142
tests passed (+1), clippy -D warnings clean, fmt clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 01:53:02 +03:00
xah30 c19a6c5586 feat(transport,tunnel): implement Wave 3 — QUIC transport + split-tunnel router
aura-transport: quinn 0.11 endpoint with HTTP/3 mimicry (ALPN h3/h3-29,
Chrome-like transport params), outer-TLS accept-any (real auth is the inner
Aura handshake), packet padding to HTTPS sizes; AuraServer/AuraClient drive the
proto handshake over a QUIC bidi stream; AuraConnection impls
aura_proto::PacketConnection (full-duplex via Session::split + per-half mutex).
14 tests incl. a real-QUIC loopback end-to-end (crypto+pki+proto+transport).

aura-tunnel: RouteTable (longest-prefix split-tunnel classify), AuraDns
(hickory) host-route registration, AuraRouter over a PacketIo TUN seam +
Arc<dyn PacketConnection>, AuraTun (tun 0.8 unix; wintun cfg-gated Windows).
10 tests (route classify/priority, dst-IP parse, mock router). send_direct is a
v1 stub. Whole workspace: tests green, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:26:39 +03:00
xah30 cb78de4f37 feat(transport): pin PacketConnection contract for the router seam
Define the async PacketConnection trait (send_packet/recv_packet over &self)
that aura-tunnel's router consumes and the QUIC connection will implement.
Committed before Wave 3 so the transport and tunnel agents build against a
stable cross-crate contract from isolated worktrees.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 18:10:17 +03:00
xah30 f78633e04f chore: scaffold Aura workspace skeleton (Stage 0)
- 6-crate Cargo workspace, dependency tree frozen (cargo check green in ~1m)
- ml-kem 0.3 (FIPS 203) replaces spec's pqcrypto-kyber for ML-KEM-768
- fix invalid target-gated workspace.dependencies: Windows deps (wintun/windows)
  declared untargeted, cfg-gated per-crate in aura-tunnel
- version bumps vs spec: tun 0.8, rcgen 0.14, wintun 0.5
- stub lib/main per crate; real implementations land wave by wave

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 17:42:40 +03:00