//! v2 in-band CRL push: server-to-client distribution of the revocation list right after a
//! successful handshake.
//!
//! The wire path reuses the existing post-handshake [`aura_proto::PacketConnection`] without
//! changing the trait or any transport. Control messages are multiplexed alongside real IP packets
//! using the 4-byte magic prefix described in [`aura_proto::CONTROL_ENVELOPE_MAGIC`]: a real
//! IPv4/IPv6 packet starts with `0x4X` or `0x6X` so a `0xAA`-prefixed envelope can never collide.
//!
//! ## Server side ([`push_crl_if_configured`])
//!
//! On each accepted connection, if `[pki] crl_push` is `true` and a CRL file + CA key are
//! configured, the server reads the plain CRL, signs it with the CA key, wraps it in a
//! [`aura_proto::ControlKind::CrlPush`] envelope, and `send_packet`s it to the client. Failures
//! are non-fatal — they log a warning and the connection proceeds (so a missing CRL file or a
//! stale signing key never tears down a freshly authenticated client).
//!
//! ## Client side ([`AcceptPushedCrlConn`])
//!
//! The client wraps the raw `Arc<dyn PacketConnection>` in [`AcceptPushedCrlConn`] before handing
//! it to the [`aura_tunnel::AuraRouter`]. Every `recv_packet` call is sniffed: if the bytes start
//! with the magic, the envelope is decoded, the signed CRL is verified against the CA, the CRL is
//! applied to the live verifier (currently informational on the client — the verifier exists per
//! handshake; the cached file is what matters for the next dial), and `recv_packet` keeps looping
//! for the next packet. Any envelope that fails to verify is dropped with a warning.
//!
//! Back-compat: a peer that does not know about CRL pushes (old client) will see a packet whose
//! first byte is `0xAA` and forward it to its TUN, which immediately rejects it as an invalid IP
//! packet (top nibble `0xA` is not a valid IP version). The session stays alive.

use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;

use aura_pki::CrlStore;
use aura_proto::{decode_control_envelope, encode_control_envelope, ControlKind, PacketConnection};
use tokio::sync::RwLock;

use crate::config::expand_tilde;

/// Build the bytes the server should send (CRL header + signed body, wrapped in a control
/// envelope), or `Ok(None)` if `[pki] crl_push` is disabled / the CRL file is missing / the CA
/// signing key is unavailable.
///
/// The CRL file at `crl_path` is taken **verbatim** (the unsigned v1 format: one id per line). It
/// is signed in-memory with the CA key at `ca_key_pem` and the resulting `CRL-Aura-v1` body +
/// `--SIGNATURE--` block is what travels on the wire.
pub fn build_push_envelope(
    crl_path: &Path,
    ca_cert_pem: &str,
    ca_key_pem: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let crl = CrlStore::load(crl_path)?;
    let signed = crl.encode_signed(ca_cert_pem, ca_key_pem)?;
    Ok(encode_control_envelope(ControlKind::CrlPush, &signed))
}

/// Send `envelope_bytes` to the peer via `conn.send_packet`. Returns the underlying transport
/// error if the send fails.
pub async fn send_push(
    conn: &Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
    envelope_bytes: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    conn.send_packet(envelope_bytes).await
}

/// Convenience: resolve the configured CRL file + CA key paths and push the CRL on `conn`.
///
/// Every step is best-effort: missing paths, unreadable files, and signing failures are logged at
/// `warn` and converted to `Ok(false)` so the accept loop keeps serving the client. Returns
/// `Ok(true)` iff the envelope was successfully transmitted, `Ok(false)` otherwise.
pub async fn push_crl_if_configured(
    crl_push_enabled: bool,
    crl_path: Option<&str>,
    ca_cert_pem: &str,
    ca_key_path: Option<&str>,
    conn: &Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
    peer: Option<&str>,
) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
    if !crl_push_enabled {
        return Ok(false);
    }
    let Some(crl_path) = crl_path else {
        tracing::debug!(
            peer = ?peer,
            "no [pki] crl configured; skipping in-band CRL push"
        );
        return Ok(false);
    };
    let Some(ca_key_path) = ca_key_path else {
        tracing::warn!(
            peer = ?peer,
            "[pki] crl_push = true but [pki] ca_key is unset; cannot sign — skipping"
        );
        return Ok(false);
    };
    let crl_path: PathBuf = expand_tilde(crl_path);
    if !crl_path.exists() {
        tracing::debug!(
            peer = ?peer,
            path = %crl_path.display(),
            "CRL file does not exist; skipping in-band CRL push (no revoked clients yet)"
        );
        return Ok(false);
    }
    let ca_key_path = expand_tilde(ca_key_path);
    let ca_key_pem = match std::fs::read_to_string(&ca_key_path) {
        Ok(p) => p,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(
                peer = ?peer,
                path = %ca_key_path.display(),
                error = %e,
                "failed to read CA signing key; skipping in-band CRL push"
            );
            return Ok(false);
        }
    };
    let envelope = match build_push_envelope(&crl_path, ca_cert_pem, &ca_key_pem) {
        Ok(v) => v,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(
                peer = ?peer,
                error = %e,
                "failed to build signed CRL envelope; skipping in-band CRL push"
            );
            return Ok(false);
        }
    };
    if let Err(e) = send_push(conn, &envelope).await {
        tracing::warn!(
            peer = ?peer,
            error = %e,
            "failed to send CRL envelope; client may be racing close"
        );
        return Ok(false);
    }
    tracing::info!(
        peer = ?peer,
        bytes = envelope.len(),
        "in-band CRL pushed to client"
    );
    Ok(true)
}

/// Client-side adapter that intercepts CRL-push control envelopes coming over `inner` and applies
/// them to a live `verifier` + optional on-disk cache.
///
/// Wrap an `Arc<dyn PacketConnection>` returned by [`aura_transport::dial`] before passing it to
/// [`aura_tunnel::AuraRouter`]. Every `recv_packet` call is sniffed: control envelopes are
/// consumed and never reach the TUN; ordinary IP packets pass through unchanged.
pub struct AcceptPushedCrlConn {
    inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
    /// CA cert PEM the client trusts — used to verify the pushed CRL's signature.
    ca_cert_pem: String,
    /// Optional on-disk cache path: every successfully verified CRL is written here so the next
    /// startup can apply it via [`AuraCertVerifier::set_revoked`](aura_pki::AuraCertVerifier::set_revoked)
    /// without depending on the server pushing again.
    cache_path: Option<PathBuf>,
    /// When `false`, the wrapper still strips control envelopes but does not apply or cache them
    /// (matches the v1 behaviour for operators who explicitly opt out).
    accept: bool,
    /// Last applied CRL — exposed for tests / inspection. The live `AuraCertVerifier` lives inside
    /// the existing handshake, so we mirror the parsed CrlStore here instead of mutating it.
    pub last_applied: Arc<RwLock<Option<CrlStore>>>,
}

impl AcceptPushedCrlConn {
    /// Wrap `inner` so CRL pushes from the server are decoded and stripped.
    ///
    /// `cache_path` (typically `[pki] crl` on the client) receives the **plain** unsigned CRL on a
    /// successful apply so the file format stays compatible with the operator-side `aura pki
    /// revoke` flow.
    pub fn new(
        inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection>,
        ca_cert_pem: String,
        cache_path: Option<PathBuf>,
        accept: bool,
    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            inner,
            ca_cert_pem,
            cache_path,
            accept,
            last_applied: Arc::new(RwLock::new(None)),
        }
    }

    /// Shared handle to the most recently applied CRL (mostly for tests).
    pub fn last_applied(&self) -> Arc<RwLock<Option<CrlStore>>> {
        Arc::clone(&self.last_applied)
    }

    /// Process a control envelope buffer extracted from a `recv_packet` call. Returns `Ok(())` so
    /// errors do not tear the session down — they only log.
    async fn handle_control(&self, kind: ControlKind, payload: Vec<u8>) {
        match kind {
            ControlKind::CrlPush => {
                if !self.accept {
                    tracing::debug!("accept_pushed_crl = false; dropping incoming CRL push");
                    return;
                }
                match CrlStore::decode_signed_verified(&payload, &self.ca_cert_pem) {
                    Ok(crl) => {
                        let count = crl.len();
                        if let Some(path) = &self.cache_path {
                            if let Err(e) = persist_crl(&crl, path) {
                                tracing::warn!(
                                    path = %path.display(),
                                    error = %e,
                                    "applied pushed CRL but failed to persist to disk"
                                );
                            }
                        }
                        *self.last_applied.write().await = Some(crl);
                        tracing::info!(entries = count, "CRL applied from server push (in-band)");
                    }
                    Err(e) => {
                        tracing::warn!(
                            error = %e,
                            "received CRL push that failed verification; dropping"
                        );
                    }
                }
            }
            ControlKind::CrlAck => {
                tracing::debug!("server CRL ack received (unexpected — client does not push CRLs)");
            }
            // v3.1 circuit-setup envelopes (ExtendBridge / CircuitReady / CircuitFailed) are only
            // meaningful during multi-hop dial (see [`crate::circuit`]). By the time this wrapper
            // sees a connection the circuit (if any) is already established, so any late envelopes
            // are a no-op here.
            ControlKind::ExtendBridge | ControlKind::CircuitReady | ControlKind::CircuitFailed => {
                tracing::debug!(
                    kind = ?kind,
                    "unexpected circuit-setup control envelope on established connection; ignoring"
                );
            }
            ControlKind::Unknown(b) => {
                tracing::debug!(kind = b, "unknown control envelope kind; ignoring");
            }
        }
    }
}

/// Write the plain (unsigned) CRL to `path` so the next client startup can apply it via
/// [`CrlStore::load`].
fn persist_crl(crl: &CrlStore, path: &Path) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
        if !parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
            std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)?;
        }
    }
    crl.save(path)
}

#[async_trait::async_trait]
impl PacketConnection for AcceptPushedCrlConn {
    async fn send_packet(&self, packet: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        // Client never sends control envelopes; pass through verbatim.
        self.inner.send_packet(packet).await
    }

    async fn recv_packet(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
        // Loop until we find a real IP packet. Control envelopes are stripped, applied, and
        // skipped — the underlying transport keeps blocking for the next datagram on its own.
        loop {
            let pkt = self.inner.recv_packet().await?;
            match decode_control_envelope(&pkt) {
                Ok(Some((kind, payload))) => {
                    self.handle_control(kind, payload).await;
                    // Continue the loop to deliver the *next* real packet to the caller.
                    continue;
                }
                Ok(None) => return Ok(pkt),
                Err(e) => {
                    // Malformed envelope (claims magic but truncated). Drop it (do not pass to
                    // TUN — its first byte is the magic and the TUN would reject it anyway) and
                    // keep looping for the next packet.
                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "malformed control envelope; dropping");
                    continue;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use std::collections::VecDeque;

    use aura_pki::AuraCa;
    use tokio::sync::Mutex;

    /// In-memory mock PacketConnection where `recv_packet` drains a FIFO of pre-loaded buffers and
    /// `send_packet` appends to a Vec we can inspect.
    struct MockConn {
        to_recv: Mutex<VecDeque<Vec<u8>>>,
        sent: Mutex<Vec<Vec<u8>>>,
    }

    impl MockConn {
        fn new(packets: impl IntoIterator<Item = Vec<u8>>) -> Self {
            Self {
                to_recv: Mutex::new(packets.into_iter().collect()),
                sent: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
            }
        }
    }

    #[async_trait::async_trait]
    impl PacketConnection for MockConn {
        async fn send_packet(&self, packet: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
            self.sent.lock().await.push(packet.to_vec());
            Ok(())
        }
        async fn recv_packet(&self) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
            self.to_recv
                .lock()
                .await
                .pop_front()
                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("mock conn drained"))
        }
    }

    /// A pushed-CRL envelope is decoded, verified, applied, and stripped from the recv stream;
    /// the next call returns the next real IP packet.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn intercepts_crl_push_and_applies() {
        // Build a CA, sign a CRL of {"alice"}.
        let ca = AuraCa::generate("Aura Test").unwrap();
        let ca_cert_pem = ca.ca_cert_pem();
        // We need the CA key PEM. AuraCa does not expose it directly; round-trip via save/load.
        let cert_path =
            std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-pki-test-{}-ca.crt", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        let key_path =
            std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-pki-test-{}-ca.key", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        ca.save(&cert_path, &key_path).unwrap();
        let ca_key_pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&key_path).unwrap();

        let mut crl = CrlStore::new();
        crl.revoke("alice");
        let signed = crl.encode_signed(&ca_cert_pem, &ca_key_pem).unwrap();
        let envelope = encode_control_envelope(ControlKind::CrlPush, &signed);

        // Build the inner mock: first packet is the CRL envelope, second is a real IPv4 packet.
        let ipv4 = vec![0x45u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0xab, 0xcd];
        let inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = Arc::new(MockConn::new([envelope, ipv4.clone()]));

        // Cache to a temp file so we also exercise persistence.
        let cache_path =
            std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-pki-test-{}-cached.crl", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));

        let wrap =
            AcceptPushedCrlConn::new(inner, ca_cert_pem.clone(), Some(cache_path.clone()), true);

        // First recv: the envelope is consumed; the next packet (real IPv4) is returned.
        let pkt = wrap.recv_packet().await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pkt, ipv4);

        // CRL was applied to the wrapper's last_applied slot.
        let applied = wrap.last_applied().read().await.clone();
        assert!(applied.is_some(), "CRL should have been applied");
        let applied = applied.unwrap();
        assert!(applied.contains("alice"));

        // And persisted on disk in the v1 plain format.
        let from_disk = CrlStore::load(&cache_path).unwrap();
        assert!(from_disk.contains("alice"));

        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(cache_path);
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(cert_path);
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(key_path);
    }

    /// A CRL push signed by a different CA must be dropped, the slot remains None, and the next
    /// real packet is still delivered.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn rejects_crl_signed_by_wrong_ca() {
        let real = AuraCa::generate("Real").unwrap();
        let rogue = AuraCa::generate("Rogue").unwrap();
        let rogue_cert =
            std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-pki-test-{}-r.crt", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        let rogue_key =
            std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-pki-test-{}-r.key", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        rogue.save(&rogue_cert, &rogue_key).unwrap();
        let rogue_key_pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&rogue_key).unwrap();
        let rogue_cert_pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&rogue_cert).unwrap();

        // Sign a CRL with the rogue CA but offer it to a client that trusts only `real`.
        let mut crl = CrlStore::new();
        crl.revoke("alice");
        let signed = crl.encode_signed(&rogue_cert_pem, &rogue_key_pem).unwrap();
        let envelope = encode_control_envelope(ControlKind::CrlPush, &signed);
        let ipv4 = vec![0x45u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14];
        let inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = Arc::new(MockConn::new([envelope, ipv4.clone()]));

        let wrap = AcceptPushedCrlConn::new(inner, real.ca_cert_pem(), None, true);

        let pkt = wrap.recv_packet().await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pkt, ipv4, "envelope dropped, real packet still delivered");
        assert!(
            wrap.last_applied().read().await.is_none(),
            "no CRL should have been applied"
        );

        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(rogue_cert);
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(rogue_key);
    }

    /// When `accept = false`, the envelope is still stripped from the stream (so it does not
    /// pollute the TUN) but is NOT applied or persisted.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn accept_false_strips_but_does_not_apply() {
        let ca = AuraCa::generate("Aura").unwrap();
        let ca_cert_pem = ca.ca_cert_pem();
        let cert_path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-{}-c.crt", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        let key_path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("aura-{}-c.key", uuid::Uuid::new_v4()));
        ca.save(&cert_path, &key_path).unwrap();
        let ca_key_pem = std::fs::read_to_string(&key_path).unwrap();

        let mut crl = CrlStore::new();
        crl.revoke("alice");
        let signed = crl.encode_signed(&ca_cert_pem, &ca_key_pem).unwrap();
        let envelope = encode_control_envelope(ControlKind::CrlPush, &signed);

        let ipv4 = vec![0x45u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14];
        let inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = Arc::new(MockConn::new([envelope, ipv4.clone()]));

        let wrap = AcceptPushedCrlConn::new(inner, ca_cert_pem, None, false);
        let pkt = wrap.recv_packet().await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(pkt, ipv4);
        assert!(wrap.last_applied().read().await.is_none());

        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(cert_path);
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(key_path);
    }

    /// Two real packets in a row pass through unchanged.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn passes_real_packets_through() {
        let real = AuraCa::generate("Real").unwrap();
        let ipv4 = vec![0x45u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14];
        let ipv6 = vec![0x60u8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00];
        let inner: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> =
            Arc::new(MockConn::new([ipv4.clone(), ipv6.clone()]));
        let wrap = AcceptPushedCrlConn::new(inner, real.ca_cert_pem(), None, true);
        assert_eq!(wrap.recv_packet().await.unwrap(), ipv4);
        assert_eq!(wrap.recv_packet().await.unwrap(), ipv6);
    }

    /// send_packet always passes through to the inner connection (the client never originates
    /// control envelopes — only the server does).
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn send_packet_passes_through() {
        let real = AuraCa::generate("Real").unwrap();
        let inner = Arc::new(MockConn::new([]));
        let inner_arc: Arc<dyn PacketConnection> = inner.clone();
        let wrap = AcceptPushedCrlConn::new(Arc::clone(&inner_arc), real.ca_cert_pem(), None, true);
        wrap.send_packet(b"hello").await.unwrap();
        let sent = inner.sent.lock().await.clone();
        assert_eq!(sent, vec![b"hello".to_vec()]);
    }
}