a070da0be9
Lays the foundation for sing-box mobile clients (Option B from
docs/sing-box.md): an independent Go module that speaks the AuraVPN wire
protocol byte-for-byte. Proof of equivalence is in KAT tests cross-loaded
from a Rust-side deterministic vector exporter.
- tools/export-kat (new Rust bin in workspace): captures a handshake +
derived keys + a sealed datagram record + a knock token using seeded
RNGs (rand::rngs::StdRng + ml-kem's *_deterministic public API), emits
JSON. Reproducible byte-for-byte.
- singbox-aura/ (new Go module, ~3000 LOC, 22 files):
- aura/frame: 5-byte protocol header + Frame{Data,Ping,Pong,Close,
Control} + magic envelope (0xAA,0xAA,0xC0,0x01) — encode/decode
matching aura-proto::frame.
- aura/crypto: hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768 (stdlib crypto/ecdh +
crypto/mlkem on Go 1.24+; falls back to circl on older Go via a
documented swap), HKDF-SHA256 derive_session_keys, ChaCha20-Poly1305
with the **LE(u64 counter) || [0;4]** nonce scheme that matches
aura-crypto::AeadKey/AeadSession.
- aura/handshake: client_handshake state machine reproducing protocol.md
§6.2 exactly (CH→SH→ServerAuth→ClientAuth→Finished×2; transcript hash;
ECDSA-P256 transcript signature; HMAC-SHA256 Finished).
- aura/session: DatagramSender/Receiver + 64-wide sliding replay window.
- aura/transport: reliable HS-adapter (DTLS-flight retransmit) + UDP
datagram data path + 16-byte HMAC port-knock with ±1-minute window.
- aura/outbound: sing-box-shaped shim (interface signatures only — sing-
box upstream registration is one more step, documented in README).
- cmd/aura-client: standalone Go binary; reads client.toml via
pelletier/go-toml/v2 and connects to a real aura server. Validates
end-to-end interop with the Rust side.
- KAT: 6 comparisons against Rust vectors — session_keys (HKDF), hybrid
KEM ek/encaps roundtrip, c2s + s2c Finished HMAC, sealed datagram
record at seq=2 (incl. 16-byte Poly1305 tag), knock token. All byte-
for-byte.
Go: 29 tests across 5 packages, all green. Only deps: golang.org/x/crypto
and pelletier/go-toml/v2. Rust: 293 tests still green; tools/export-kat
added to workspace members.
v1 limits documented in singbox-aura/README.md: UDP-only (no TCP/QUIC
fallback yet), no cell padding / cover traffic, no relay/exit role, no
multi-hop, sing-box upstream-registration sketch (vendor sagernet/sing-box +
init() RegisterOutbound) for follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
280 lines
8.6 KiB
Go
280 lines
8.6 KiB
Go
package crypto
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/hmac"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/binary"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"testing"
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)
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// vectorsJSON mirrors the JSON written by tools/export-kat (in Rust). Every field is hex.
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type vectorsJSON struct {
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CAFingerprint string `json:"ca_fingerprint"`
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ClientX25519Priv string `json:"client_x25519_priv"`
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ClientX25519Pub string `json:"client_x25519_pub"`
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ClientKyberPriv string `json:"client_kyber_priv"`
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ClientKyberPub string `json:"client_kyber_pub"`
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ServerX25519EphPriv string `json:"server_x25519_eph_priv"`
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ServerX25519EphPub string `json:"server_x25519_eph_pub"`
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ServerKyberCt string `json:"server_kyber_ct"`
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ClientNonce string `json:"client_nonce"`
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ServerNonce string `json:"server_nonce"`
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X25519SS string `json:"x25519_ss"`
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KyberSS string `json:"kyber_ss"`
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SessionKeys struct {
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C2S string `json:"c2s"`
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S2C string `json:"s2c"`
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} `json:"session_keys"`
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TranscriptHash string `json:"transcript_hash"`
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ClientFinishedHmac string `json:"client_finished_hmac"`
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ServerFinishedHmac string `json:"server_finished_hmac"`
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DatagramTest struct {
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Seq uint64 `json:"seq"`
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Frame string `json:"frame"`
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Key string `json:"key"`
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SealedRecord string `json:"sealed_record"`
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} `json:"datagram_test"`
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KnockTest struct {
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CAFingerprint string `json:"ca_fingerprint"`
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UnixMinute uint64 `json:"unix_minute"`
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Knock string `json:"knock"`
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} `json:"knock_test"`
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}
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// loadVectors finds the vectors file at <module>/kat/vectors.json. The file is created by
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//
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// cargo run -p export-kat
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//
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// from the workspace root.
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func loadVectors(t *testing.T) *vectorsJSON {
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t.Helper()
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// crypto_test.go is at singbox-aura/aura/crypto/. The KAT lives at singbox-aura/kat/.
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_, thisFile, _, ok := runtime.Caller(0)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("runtime.Caller failed")
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}
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path := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(thisFile), "..", "..", "kat", "vectors.json")
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data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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t.Skipf("KAT vectors.json not present at %s — run `cargo run -p export-kat` first: %v", path, err)
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return nil
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}
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var v vectorsJSON
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &v); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse vectors.json: %v", err)
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}
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return &v
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}
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func mustHex(t *testing.T, s string) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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b, err := hex.DecodeString(s)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("hex decode %q: %v", s, err)
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}
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return b
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}
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func mustHex32(t *testing.T, s string) [32]byte {
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b := mustHex(t, s)
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if len(b) != 32 {
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t.Fatalf("want 32 bytes, got %d", len(b))
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}
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var out [32]byte
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copy(out[:], b)
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return out
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}
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// TestKAT_SessionKeys: HKDF-derive from the shared secrets in the vector reproduces the
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// session_keys.{c2s,s2c} byte-for-byte.
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func TestKAT_SessionKeys(t *testing.T) {
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v := loadVectors(t)
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if v == nil {
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return
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}
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xss := mustHex32(t, v.X25519SS)
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kss := mustHex32(t, v.KyberSS)
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cn := mustHex32(t, v.ClientNonce)
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sn := mustHex32(t, v.ServerNonce)
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wantC2S := mustHex(t, v.SessionKeys.C2S)
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wantS2C := mustHex(t, v.SessionKeys.S2C)
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shared := &HybridSharedSecret{X25519SS: xss, MLKEMSS: kss}
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keys := DeriveSessionKeys(shared, cn, sn)
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if !bytes.Equal(keys.ClientToServer[:], wantC2S) {
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t.Fatalf("c2s mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %x", keys.ClientToServer, wantC2S)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(keys.ServerToClient[:], wantS2C) {
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t.Fatalf("s2c mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %x", keys.ServerToClient, wantS2C)
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}
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}
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// TestKAT_HybridDecapsulateRoundtrip: load the client's deterministic hybrid key from the
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// vector, then run Decapsulate against the server's ciphertext. The derived shared secrets must
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// match x25519_ss / kyber_ss in the vector.
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func TestKAT_HybridDecapsulateRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
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v := loadVectors(t)
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if v == nil {
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return
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}
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xPriv := mustHex32(t, v.ClientX25519Priv)
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// We don't ship the ml-kem seed in the JSON directly (the export tool uses a fixed seed and
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// stores only the expanded private key for diagnostics). Instead, reconstruct from the seed
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// the export tool documents — match the literal bytes in tools/export-kat/src/main.rs.
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var seed [64]byte
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copy(seed[:32], []byte("AURA-MLKEM-DSEED-CLIENT--FIXED32"))
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copy(seed[32:], []byte("AURA-MLKEM-ZSEED-CLIENT--FIXED32"))
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priv, pub, err := NewHybridPrivateFromBytes(xPriv, seed)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("rebuild hybrid: %v", err)
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}
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// Sanity: the recomputed encapsulation key must match what the Rust side emitted.
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if !bytes.Equal(pub.MLKEM, mustHex(t, v.ClientKyberPub)) {
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t.Fatalf("ml-kem ek mismatch: Go and Rust derive different bytes from the same seed")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(pub.X25519[:], mustHex(t, v.ClientX25519Pub)) {
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t.Fatalf("x25519 pub mismatch")
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}
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// Decapsulate.
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ct := &HybridCiphertext{MLKEMCT: mustHex(t, v.ServerKyberCt)}
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copy(ct.X25519Eph[:], mustHex(t, v.ServerX25519EphPub))
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ss, err := priv.Decapsulate(ct)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decapsulate: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(ss.X25519SS[:], mustHex(t, v.X25519SS)) {
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t.Fatalf("x25519_ss mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %s", ss.X25519SS, v.X25519SS)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(ss.MLKEMSS[:], mustHex(t, v.KyberSS)) {
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t.Fatalf("kyber_ss mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %s", ss.MLKEMSS, v.KyberSS)
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}
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}
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// TestKAT_ClientFinishedHMAC: HMAC-SHA256(c2s, transcript_hash) reproduces the Rust value.
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func TestKAT_ClientFinishedHMAC(t *testing.T) {
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v := loadVectors(t)
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if v == nil {
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return
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}
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key := mustHex(t, v.SessionKeys.C2S)
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transcript := mustHex(t, v.TranscriptHash)
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
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mac.Write(transcript)
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got := mac.Sum(nil)
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want := mustHex(t, v.ClientFinishedHmac)
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("client finished mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %x", got, want)
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}
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}
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// TestKAT_ServerFinishedHMAC: HMAC-SHA256(s2c, transcript_hash) reproduces the Rust value.
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func TestKAT_ServerFinishedHMAC(t *testing.T) {
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v := loadVectors(t)
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if v == nil {
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return
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}
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key := mustHex(t, v.SessionKeys.S2C)
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transcript := mustHex(t, v.TranscriptHash)
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
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mac.Write(transcript)
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got := mac.Sum(nil)
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want := mustHex(t, v.ServerFinishedHmac)
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("server finished mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %x", got, want)
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}
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}
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// TestKAT_SealedDatagramRecord: ChaCha20-Poly1305.Seal under the c2s key at seq 2 with
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// aad=seq_be reproduces the exact sealed_record bytes (seq_be || ciphertext).
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func TestKAT_SealedDatagramRecord(t *testing.T) {
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v := loadVectors(t)
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if v == nil {
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return
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}
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key, err := NewAeadKey(mustHex(t, v.DatagramTest.Key))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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frameBytes := mustHex(t, v.DatagramTest.Frame)
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seq := v.DatagramTest.Seq
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var seqBE [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(seqBE[:], seq)
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ct := key.Seal(seq, frameBytes, seqBE[:])
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got := append(append([]byte{}, seqBE[:]...), ct...)
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want := mustHex(t, v.DatagramTest.SealedRecord)
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("sealed datagram mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %x", got, want)
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}
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// Round-trip: opening at the same seq must return the original frame bytes.
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pt, err := key.Open(seq, ct, seqBE[:])
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("open: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(pt, frameBytes) {
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t.Fatal("open returned different plaintext")
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}
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}
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// TestKAT_KnockToken: HMAC-SHA256(ca_fp, u64_be(minute))[:16] matches the Rust knock value.
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func TestKAT_KnockToken(t *testing.T) {
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v := loadVectors(t)
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if v == nil {
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return
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}
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key := mustHex(t, v.KnockTest.CAFingerprint)
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var mb [8]byte
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binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(mb[:], v.KnockTest.UnixMinute)
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mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
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mac.Write(mb[:])
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tag := mac.Sum(nil)
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if len(tag) < 16 {
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t.Fatalf("hmac too short: %d", len(tag))
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}
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got := tag[:16]
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want := mustHex(t, v.KnockTest.Knock)
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if !bytes.Equal(got, want) {
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t.Fatalf("knock mismatch:\n got %x\nwant %x", got, want)
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}
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}
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// TestNonceLayout: explicit sanity that NonceFor matches the documented LE(u64) || 0x00000000.
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func TestNonceLayout(t *testing.T) {
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if got := NonceFor(0); got != ([NonceLen]byte{}) {
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t.Fatalf("counter 0: want zero, got %x", got)
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}
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n := NonceFor(0x0807060504030201)
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if !bytes.Equal(n[:8], []byte{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}) {
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t.Fatalf("LE layout wrong: %x", n[:8])
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(n[8:], []byte{0, 0, 0, 0}) {
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t.Fatalf("upper 4 bytes not zero: %x", n[8:])
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}
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}
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// TestAeadSessionCounterMonotonic: Seal/Open lock-step advances the counter by exactly 1.
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func TestAeadSessionCounterMonotonic(t *testing.T) {
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key := make([]byte, 32)
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for i := range key {
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key[i] = byte(i)
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}
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s, err := NewAeadSession(key)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if s.Counter() != 0 {
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t.Fatalf("initial counter %d", s.Counter())
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}
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for want := uint64(1); want <= 5; want++ {
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_ = s.Seal([]byte("x"), nil)
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if s.Counter() != want {
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t.Fatalf("after %d seals: counter %d", want, s.Counter())
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}
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}
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}
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