xah30
fe618b839d
Completes v3.1 multi-hop / onion routing (2 hops: client → entry-relay →
exit-server). Combined with the scaffold commit (6c14c0d), the property
holds: entry-relay knows the client IP + client_id but cannot decrypt the
data; exit knows the destination but sees the relay's IP as source.
- aura-cli::circuit: dial_circuit(&[entry, exit], proto_cfg, udp_opts) →
CircuitConnection. Connects to entry as a normal UdpClient, sends an
ExtendBridge control envelope, awaits CircuitReady, then runs a SECOND
Aura handshake to the exit through a local loopback UDP proxy — the
forwarder ferries datagrams between that proxy socket and the outer
relay PacketConnection. The inner handshake therefore authenticates the
EXIT cert (verified by the integration test asserting
circuit.peer_id() == "localhost-exit"); the relay never sees the inner
session keys.
- aura-cli::relay: rendezvous(conn, whitelist) -> Bridged{bridge} |
Fallback{first_pkt} | Refused. 2-second window after handshake to receive
ExtendBridge. Whitelist enforced; CircuitFailed on miss. Empty whitelist
logs a warning and runs open. Timeout / non-control → Fallback so the
same server can be both relay (for circuit clients) and exit (for direct
clients) simultaneously.
- aura-cli::client: when [client.circuit] enabled → dial_circuit; falls
back to normal aura_transport::dial when disabled.
- aura-cli::server: relay rendezvous wired before pool/CRL/router path.
run_bridge spawns two forwarder tasks (conn↔bridge UDP socket).
- 3 integration tests: end-to-end (with peer_id assertion), whitelist
rejection, back-compat (relay disabled → Err). 3 unit tests in relay.rs.
Workspace: 253 tests passed (247 baseline + 6 new), clippy -D warnings clean,
fmt clean. No new workspace deps. All 28 tracked tasks (v1 + v2 + v3.1) now
complete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
144 lines
6.9 KiB
TOML
144 lines
6.9 KiB
TOML
# Aura VPN client configuration (project §9).
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# Copy to client.toml and adjust. Paths may begin with `~` (expands to your home directory).
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[client]
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# Human-readable client name / id.
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name = "laptop"
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# Server UDP socket address.
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server_addr = "203.0.113.10:443"
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# Outer-TLS SNI (camouflage hostname) presented to the server. Also the name verified
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# inside the Aura handshake against the server certificate's SAN.
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sni = "cdn.example.com"
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# Optional: drop privileges to this non-root user AFTER the TUN device has been brought up.
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# Recommended when `aura client` is launched via sudo so the long-running router loop runs
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# as an ordinary user. Linux uses setresuid/setresgid; macOS uses setgid/setuid; Windows is a
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# no-op (use a service account instead). When omitted (or already running as non-root) no
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# privilege change happens.
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# run_as = "nobody"
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# Suppress identifier fields (peer_id, client_ip, source_addr, ...) from log output. The events
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# still fire; only the identifying fields are dropped before formatting. Default: false. Set to
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# true to keep the local log file from accumulating per-session identifiers.
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no_logs = false
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# Optional fallback server addresses (IP or IP:port). When the primary `server_addr` cannot be
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# reached on any transport, the client retries the bridges in a process-randomised order, using
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# the same per-transport ports from [transport]. The bridge `:port` part is parsed but ignored.
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# bridges = ["203.0.113.11", "203.0.113.12"]
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[pki]
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# Trust anchor (the Aura CA) and this client's leaf cert/key, all PEM.
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# Issue with: aura pki issue-client --id laptop --out ~/.aura --ca ~/.aura
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ca_cert = "~/.aura/ca.crt"
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cert = "~/.aura/client.crt"
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key = "~/.aura/client.key"
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[tunnel]
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# Requested TUN interface name (advisory on macOS, where the kernel assigns utunN).
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tun_name = "aura0"
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# Local address assigned to the TUN device, and its prefix length.
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local_ip = "10.7.0.2"
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prefix = 24
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# TUN MTU.
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mtu = 1420
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# Tunnel resolver DNS (informational; the system resolver is used in v1).
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dns = "10.7.0.1"
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# Split-tunnel routing: the default action plus per-destination overrides.
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[tunnel.split]
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# Default for destinations matching no rule below: "VPN" or "DIRECT".
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default = "VPN"
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# Send these directly (bypass the tunnel): RFC1918 ranges stay on the LAN...
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[[tunnel.split.direct]]
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cidr = "192.168.0.0/16"
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[[tunnel.split.direct]]
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cidr = "10.0.0.0/8"
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# ...and a corporate domain egresses directly (resolved to host routes at startup).
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[[tunnel.split.direct]]
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domain = "intranet.example.com"
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# Force a more-specific range back through the VPN (longest-prefix wins over 10.0.0.0/8).
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[[tunnel.split.vpn]]
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cidr = "10.7.0.0/24"
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# v2: OS-level split-tunnel routing. With `enabled = true` (the default) the client programs the
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# system routing table at startup so DIRECT destinations bypass the TUN entirely — they continue
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# to use the host's original default gateway, while only VPN-classified traffic reaches the
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# tunnel. This eliminates the v1 user-space `send_direct` stub, where DIRECT packets were merely
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# logged and dropped. The guard is RAII: the routes are rolled back when `aura client` exits.
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#
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# Linux: uses `ip route add ... via <gw> dev <egress>` for bypasses and `ip route add ... dev <tun>`
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# for the VPN default; the VPN default carries metric 50 so it wins over DHCP-installed defaults.
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# macOS: uses `route add -net <cidr> <gw>` for bypasses and `route add -net <cidr> -interface <tun>`
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# for VPN routes.
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# Windows: not implemented in v1 (the section is parsed but the install is a logged no-op).
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[tunnel.os_routes]
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# Master switch. `false` falls back to the v1 user-space router (the `send_direct` path drops
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# DIRECT packets; kept intentionally as a fallback). Default: true.
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enabled = true
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# When `true`, every routing command is only logged (`would run: ...`) and not executed —
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# useful for testing the plan without root. Default: false.
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dry_run = false
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# Optional explicit IPv4 default gateway. When omitted, auto-detected (Linux:
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# `ip route show default`; macOS: `route -n get default`).
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# gateway = "192.168.1.1"
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# Optional explicit egress interface name (e.g. "eth0" on Linux, "en0" on macOS). When omitted,
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# auto-detected alongside the gateway.
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# egress_iface = "en0"
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[mimicry]
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# Enable traffic padding to blend packet sizes into HTTPS buckets.
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padding = false
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[transport]
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# Fallback order tried left-to-right ("handover"): the first transport that connects wins. Aura's
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# own UDP transport is primary; TCP/443 and QUIC (HTTP/3 mimicry) are fallbacks for networks that
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# throttle or block plain UDP. Omitting this whole section uses ["udp","tcp","quic"] on 443/443/444.
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order = ["udp", "tcp", "quic"]
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# Per-transport server ports. The server IP comes from [client] server_addr above (its port there is
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# ignored). The UDP transport and QUIC both ride UDP, so udp_port and quic_port MUST differ; TCP may
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# reuse the UDP port number.
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udp_port = 443
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tcp_port = 443
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quic_port = 444
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# UDP: pad datagrams up to HTTPS size buckets to blur the on-wire size distribution.
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obfuscate = true
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# TCP: prepend a minimal HTTP/1.1 preamble (Host = [client] sni) so the open resembles plain HTTP.
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masquerade = true
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[transport.masks]
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# Daily protocol-mask rotation. When `true`, every day at 05:00 MSK (= 02:00 UTC) the client
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# derives a new (SNI, User-Agent, Server-header, padding-profile) tuple from
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# HKDF-SHA256(CA-fingerprint, MSK-date) and uses it for any subsequent connect — the server derives
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# the same tuple independently from the same CA fingerprint, so no wire coordination is needed.
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# Existing connections keep the mask they connected with. Default: true.
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# When `false`, the static values above ([client] sni, [transport] obfuscate, ...) are used as-is.
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enabled = true
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[transport.knock]
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# UDP port-knocking. Must match the server's setting. Default: false.
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enabled = false
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knock_secret_source = "ca_fingerprint"
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[transport.cover]
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# Idle-time cover traffic. Must match the server's setting. Default: false.
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enabled = false
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mean_interval_ms = 500
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jitter = 0.5
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# v3.1 multi-hop / onion routing: dial through an entry-relay before reaching the exit-server.
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# When `enabled = true`, the client opens an OUTER Aura UDP connection to `hops[0]` (the relay),
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# sends one ExtendBridge envelope describing `hops[1]` (the exit), waits for CircuitReady, and
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# then runs an INNER Aura handshake addressed to the exit through that relay — two AEAD layers
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# per packet, the exit knows the client's CN but not the source IP, the relay knows the source
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# IP but not the destination nor a single plaintext byte. Exactly two hops are required in
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# v3.1; configure the relay-server with [server.relay] enabled = true and
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# allow_extend_to = ["<this client's exit IP:port>"].
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#
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# Omitting the section (or `enabled = false`) keeps the v2 single-hop dial path intact —
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# [client] server_addr / [transport] order rules apply as before.
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# [client.circuit]
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# enabled = true
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# hops = ["198.51.100.5:443", "203.0.113.10:443"] # [entry_relay, exit_server] — literal IP:port
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