Files
AuraVPN/config/client.toml.example
T
xah30 9b98004424 feat(cli): v3.2 multi-hop — per-hop cert, cell padding, 3-hop, CIDR whitelist
Closes the v3.1 unlinkability gap and resists volume/timing correlation:

1) Per-hop client cert (identity-unlinkable hops). [[client.circuit.hops]]
   now accepts {addr, cert_path, key_path, [server_name]} per hop — each
   hop sees a different CN, so a relay and an exit cannot correlate the
   same client by certificate. Old flat `hops = ["ip:port"]` form still
   parses (serde untagged enum) and falls back to [pki] cert/key.
   `aura provision-client --circuit-hops N` mints N fresh UUIDv4 certs.

2) Cell padding. CellPaddingConn wrapper pads every outgoing packet to a
   fixed size (default 1280 bytes; `cell_size = N` configurable) before
   it hits the inner AEAD. Format: u16_be(real_len) || pkt || zero_pad.
   On-wire sizes become constant -> defeats volume/timing fingerprints.
   Opt-in via [client.circuit] cell_padding = true and the mirror
   [server] cell_padding_for_circuit_clients = true.

3) 3-hop support. dial_circuit now accepts N >= 2 hops; iterative
   ExtendBridge nests N-1 forwarders and N handshakes. Client owns the
   full chain via CircuitConnection (forwarders abort on drop).
   New integration test multihop_v3_2_three_hops_end_to_end runs three
   in-process actors (A relay -> B relay -> C exit) on loopback and
   verifies peer_id == C's CN.

4) CIDR whitelist. [server.relay] allow_extend_to entries accept
   "10.0.0.0/24" (subnet, any port), "10.0.0.0/24:443" (subnet + port),
   "[2001:db8::/32]:443" (IPv6 with port), as well as exact IP:port.
   Empty list keeps the v3.1 open-relay (warn).

19 new tests; workspace 276 passed (+19), clippy -D warnings clean, fmt clean.
257 baseline tests untouched; all v2 / v3.1 / LE configs work as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27 20:07:12 +03:00

173 lines
7.9 KiB
TOML

# Aura VPN client configuration (project §9).
# Copy to client.toml and adjust. Paths may begin with `~` (expands to your home directory).
[client]
# Human-readable client name / id.
name = "laptop"
# Server UDP socket address.
server_addr = "203.0.113.10:443"
# Outer-TLS SNI (camouflage hostname) presented to the server. Also the name verified
# inside the Aura handshake against the server certificate's SAN.
sni = "cdn.example.com"
# Optional: drop privileges to this non-root user AFTER the TUN device has been brought up.
# Recommended when `aura client` is launched via sudo so the long-running router loop runs
# as an ordinary user. Linux uses setresuid/setresgid; macOS uses setgid/setuid; Windows is a
# no-op (use a service account instead). When omitted (or already running as non-root) no
# privilege change happens.
# run_as = "nobody"
# Suppress identifier fields (peer_id, client_ip, source_addr, ...) from log output. The events
# still fire; only the identifying fields are dropped before formatting. Default: false. Set to
# true to keep the local log file from accumulating per-session identifiers.
no_logs = false
# Optional fallback server addresses (IP or IP:port). When the primary `server_addr` cannot be
# reached on any transport, the client retries the bridges in a process-randomised order, using
# the same per-transport ports from [transport]. The bridge `:port` part is parsed but ignored.
# bridges = ["203.0.113.11", "203.0.113.12"]
[pki]
# Trust anchor (the Aura CA) and this client's leaf cert/key, all PEM.
# Issue with: aura pki issue-client --id laptop --out ~/.aura --ca ~/.aura
ca_cert = "~/.aura/ca.crt"
cert = "~/.aura/client.crt"
key = "~/.aura/client.key"
[tunnel]
# Requested TUN interface name (advisory on macOS, where the kernel assigns utunN).
tun_name = "aura0"
# Local address assigned to the TUN device, and its prefix length.
local_ip = "10.7.0.2"
prefix = 24
# TUN MTU.
mtu = 1420
# Tunnel resolver DNS (informational; the system resolver is used in v1).
dns = "10.7.0.1"
# Split-tunnel routing: the default action plus per-destination overrides.
[tunnel.split]
# Default for destinations matching no rule below: "VPN" or "DIRECT".
default = "VPN"
# Send these directly (bypass the tunnel): RFC1918 ranges stay on the LAN...
[[tunnel.split.direct]]
cidr = "192.168.0.0/16"
[[tunnel.split.direct]]
cidr = "10.0.0.0/8"
# ...and a corporate domain egresses directly (resolved to host routes at startup).
[[tunnel.split.direct]]
domain = "intranet.example.com"
# Force a more-specific range back through the VPN (longest-prefix wins over 10.0.0.0/8).
[[tunnel.split.vpn]]
cidr = "10.7.0.0/24"
# v2: OS-level split-tunnel routing. With `enabled = true` (the default) the client programs the
# system routing table at startup so DIRECT destinations bypass the TUN entirely — they continue
# to use the host's original default gateway, while only VPN-classified traffic reaches the
# tunnel. This eliminates the v1 user-space `send_direct` stub, where DIRECT packets were merely
# logged and dropped. The guard is RAII: the routes are rolled back when `aura client` exits.
#
# Linux: uses `ip route add ... via <gw> dev <egress>` for bypasses and `ip route add ... dev <tun>`
# for the VPN default; the VPN default carries metric 50 so it wins over DHCP-installed defaults.
# macOS: uses `route add -net <cidr> <gw>` for bypasses and `route add -net <cidr> -interface <tun>`
# for VPN routes.
# Windows: not implemented in v1 (the section is parsed but the install is a logged no-op).
[tunnel.os_routes]
# Master switch. `false` falls back to the v1 user-space router (the `send_direct` path drops
# DIRECT packets; kept intentionally as a fallback). Default: true.
enabled = true
# When `true`, every routing command is only logged (`would run: ...`) and not executed —
# useful for testing the plan without root. Default: false.
dry_run = false
# Optional explicit IPv4 default gateway. When omitted, auto-detected (Linux:
# `ip route show default`; macOS: `route -n get default`).
# gateway = "192.168.1.1"
# Optional explicit egress interface name (e.g. "eth0" on Linux, "en0" on macOS). When omitted,
# auto-detected alongside the gateway.
# egress_iface = "en0"
[mimicry]
# Enable traffic padding to blend packet sizes into HTTPS buckets.
padding = false
[transport]
# Fallback order tried left-to-right ("handover"): the first transport that connects wins. Aura's
# own UDP transport is primary; TCP/443 and QUIC (HTTP/3 mimicry) are fallbacks for networks that
# throttle or block plain UDP. Omitting this whole section uses ["udp","tcp","quic"] on 443/443/444.
order = ["udp", "tcp", "quic"]
# Per-transport server ports. The server IP comes from [client] server_addr above (its port there is
# ignored). The UDP transport and QUIC both ride UDP, so udp_port and quic_port MUST differ; TCP may
# reuse the UDP port number.
udp_port = 443
tcp_port = 443
quic_port = 444
# UDP: pad datagrams up to HTTPS size buckets to blur the on-wire size distribution.
obfuscate = true
# TCP: prepend a minimal HTTP/1.1 preamble (Host = [client] sni) so the open resembles plain HTTP.
masquerade = true
[transport.masks]
# Daily protocol-mask rotation. When `true`, every day at 05:00 MSK (= 02:00 UTC) the client
# derives a new (SNI, User-Agent, Server-header, padding-profile) tuple from
# HKDF-SHA256(CA-fingerprint, MSK-date) and uses it for any subsequent connect — the server derives
# the same tuple independently from the same CA fingerprint, so no wire coordination is needed.
# Existing connections keep the mask they connected with. Default: true.
# When `false`, the static values above ([client] sni, [transport] obfuscate, ...) are used as-is.
enabled = true
[transport.knock]
# UDP port-knocking. Must match the server's setting. Default: false.
enabled = false
knock_secret_source = "ca_fingerprint"
[transport.cover]
# Idle-time cover traffic. Must match the server's setting. Default: false.
enabled = false
mean_interval_ms = 500
jitter = 0.5
# v3.1 / v3.2 multi-hop / onion routing: dial through 1 or 2 intermediate hops before reaching
# the exit-server. When `enabled = true`, the client opens an OUTER Aura UDP connection to
# `hops[0]` (the entry-relay), sends one ExtendBridge envelope describing the next hop, waits for
# CircuitReady, then either dials the exit directly (2-hop) or repeats the ExtendBridge dance
# through a middle relay (3-hop). The innermost handshake authenticates the EXIT's cert opaquely
# — every relay sees only the next-hop address and AEAD ciphertext.
#
# v3.2 adds:
# * per-hop client certificates (the entry-relay and the exit see DIFFERENT CNs — they cannot
# link the two handshakes by identity), and
# * cell padding (every packet is padded to a constant `cell_size` bytes before sending — the
# exit MUST also enable `[server] cell_padding_for_circuit_clients = true` to decode), and
# * 3-hop support (just add a third [[client.circuit.hops]] table).
#
# Omitting the section (or `enabled = false`) keeps the v2 single-hop dial path intact.
#
# --- v3.1 FLAT FORM (back-compat) — every hop uses the [pki] cert/key above (NOT unlinkable):
# [client.circuit]
# enabled = true
# hops = ["198.51.100.5:443", "203.0.113.10:443"]
#
# --- v3.2 PER-HOP FORM — each hop has its own cert/key (identity-unlinkable):
# [client.circuit]
# enabled = true
# cell_padding = true
# cell_size = 1280
#
# [[client.circuit.hops]]
# addr = "198.51.100.5:443"
# cert_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/entry.crt"
# key_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/entry.key"
#
# [[client.circuit.hops]] # OPTIONAL middle hop for a 3-hop circuit
# addr = "198.51.100.99:443"
# cert_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/middle.crt"
# key_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/middle.key"
#
# [[client.circuit.hops]]
# addr = "203.0.113.10:443"
# cert_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/exit.crt"
# key_path = "~/.config/aura/circuit/exit.key"
#
# Generate per-hop certs in one command: `aura provision-client --circuit-hops 3 ...`